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For protecting users’ private data, local differential privacy (LDP)
has been leveraged to provide the privacy-preserving range query,
thus supporting further statistical analysis. However, existing LDP-
based range query approaches are limited by their properties, i.e.,
collecting user data according to a pre-defined structure. These
static frameworks would incur excessive noise added to the aggre-
gated data especially in the low privacy budget setting. In this work,
we propose an Adaptive Hierarchical Decomposition (AHEAD) pro-
tocol, which adaptively and dynamically controls the built tree
structure, so that the injected noise is well controlled for maintain-
ing high utility. Furthermore, we derive a guideline for properly
choosing parameters for AHEAD so that the overall utility can be
consistently competitive while rigorously satisfying LDP. Leverag-
ing multiple real and synthetic datasets, we extensively show the
effectiveness of AHEAD in both low and high dimensional range
query scenarios, as well as its advantages over the state-of-the-art
methods. In addition, we provide a series of useful observations for
deploying AHEAD in practice.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the increasing incidents of data breaches, such as Facebook
[44], Marriott [47], Exactis [23], etc., users’ privacy has become
a serious obstacle in many practical applications. As a promising
countermeasure, differential privacy (DP) [16, 17] has been accepted
as the de facto standard for protecting data privacy in academia and
industry [18, 28, 32, 33, 41, 49, 74], due to its rigorous theoretical
guarantees and independence of attacker’s background knowledge.
DP in the centralized setting requires a trusted aggregator that col-
lects sensitive data from users and performs perturbation analysis,
and then provides data services by answering queries or publishing
synthetic data [22, 79].
When there is no trusted aggregator, DP in the centralized set-
ting is no longer applicable and users are often reluctant to share
their private data without protection. To address this obstacle, local
differential privacy (LDP) [15, 55] is proposed, which allows indi-
viduals to encode and perturb their private data locally. In recent
years, LDP has been deployed by many well-known leading com-
panies, including Google [20, 21], Apple [13] and Microsoft [14].
For example, Google collects users’ favorite homepages and Apple
analyzes users’ emoji preferences with LDP.
Previous studies [6, 7, 20, 59, 61] on LDP mainly focus on ob-
taining frequency distribution throughout the entire domain, i.e.,
frequency oracle (FO) [65]. However, in practice, people may be
more interested in a range query, i.e., estimating the frequency in a
certain range of a domain. For instance, supermarkets are interested
to know the proportion of their high-income customers, e.g., earn-
ing between 100K to 120K dollars annually, to make commercial
policies. Furthermore, based on range query results, we can directly
obtain other distribution features such as order statistics [48].
For range query, recent main-stream solutions can be divided
into two categories by query dimension. For low(≤ 2)-dimensional
query scenes, Wang et al. [62] proposed to hierarchically decom-
pose the entire domain based on the complete 𝐵-ary tree structure
and answer the range query by accumulating the frequency values,
which was originally developed by Hay et al. [27] in the centralized
setting. Cormode et al. [11] proposed to apply the discrete wavelet
transformation (based on a full binary tree structure over the do-
main) to convert each user’s private value to a Haar wavelet coeffi-
cient vector for perturbation and perform inverse transformation
to get the query answer, as a generalization of [70] under the cen-
tralized DP setting. For high(≥ 2)-dimensional range query, Yang
et al. [73] proposed to combine information from 1, 2-dimensional
grids, which was originally proposed by Qardaji et al. [50] in the
centralized setting, and leverage the weighted update strategy to
estimate the high-dimensional range queries. However, the existing
methods have several limitations. First, there exist sparse areas in
the data domain of most real-world datasets. For instance, 50-60
years old people account for a small ratio among the members of a
football club. Therefore, the nodes (cells) with small values in the
complete tree (grid) are highly likely to be overwhelmed by the in-
jected noises. In addition, existing techniques are mainly designed
for specific dimensional queries, i.e., [11, 62] for 1, 2-dim queries
and [73] for high(≥ 2)-dimensional queries. Although [11, 62, 73]
are not technically limited by query dimensions, they are less effec-
tive in the case of non-target dimensions. Since the dimensions of
datasets are various in practice, the aggregator needs to combine
the algorithms for different scenarios, thus limiting the adaptability
and applicability of these algorithms.
To suppress the excessive injected noises, AHEAD provides a
fine domain decomposition mechanism to accommodate the in-
jected noise of nodes with various granularities in the tree. In order
to enable AHEAD to find the proper domain decomposition, we
carefully analyze the error source of the query answer obtained by
AHEAD, and provide a guideline to obtain the decomposition. After
AHEAD completes the interaction with all users, there exist certain
constraints on nodes’ values, e.g., the sum of the children’s values
is equal to their parent’s value. Thus, a post-processing method is
designed for AHEAD to further boost the query accuracy. For high-
dimensional queries, we compare two different expansion methods,
i.e., Direct Estimation (DE) and Leveraging Low-dimensional Esti-
mation (LLE), and show the advantage of LLE based on experimental
results.
To validate the effectiveness of AHEAD, we use multiple real and
synthetic datasets to show the consistent advantage of AHEAD over
the state-of-the-art methods. Specifically, on several real datasets,
AHEAD can achieve significantly smaller estimation errors as com-
pared to previous works by up to two orders of magnitude. For low
dimensional scenarios, we evaluate various combinations of essen-
tial parameters, e.g., privacy budget, domain size, user scale and
distribution skewness, and then provide a comprehensive under-
standing of AHEAD by considering 757 parameter combinations in
order to guide its adoption in practice. For high dimensional scenar-
ios, we investigate the query accuracy of AHEAD in different data
Table 1: Summary of mathematical notations.
Notation Description
𝑁 The total number of users (user scale)
𝐷 Private attribute domain
𝐵 Tree fanout
𝑚 The number of private attributes
𝜖 Privacy budget
\ Threshold for intervals decomposition
dimensions and attribute correlations, and show the characteristics
of AHEAD and competitors based on experimental results.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are three-fold:
• We propose a dynamic algorithm for range query under LDP,
which can adaptively determine the granularity of the domain
composition. As compared to the state-of-the-art techniques,
AHEAD can reduce the impact of the inserted noise to range
queries for maintaining outstanding utility performance.
• We theoretically derive the parameter settings (decomposition
threshold and tree fanout) for the consistent high utility under
rigorous LDP guarantees. Furthermore, we extend our strategy
to multi-dimensional scenarios.
• Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the effective-
ness of AHEAD on multiple real-world datasets as well as its
advantages over previous approaches in balancing the utility and
privacy tradeoff. In addition, we present six useful observations
for deploying AHEAD in practical use.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Local Differential Privacy
In LDP, each user perturbs his/her private data 𝑣 , through a pertur-
bation mechanism Ψ, and then transmits Ψ(𝑣) to the aggregator
while satisfying rigorous LDP guarantees defined as below.
Definition 2.1. 𝜖−Local Differential Privacy ( 𝜖-LDP ) [38]. A
perturbation function Ψ(·) satisfies 𝜖-LDP if and only if for 𝜖 > 0
and all possible pairs of input 𝑣1, 𝑣2 ∈ 𝐷 , we have
∀𝑇 ∈ Range(Ψ) : Pr [Ψ (𝑣1) ∈ 𝑇 ] ≤ 𝑒𝜖Pr [Ψ (𝑣2) ∈ 𝑇 ] ,
where Range(Ψ) denotes the set of all possible outputs of Ψ.
2.2 Frequency Oracle
The frequency oracle (FO) protocol is used to estimate the frequency
distribution 𝐹 across a private attribute, serving as a basic building
block for general LDP tasks such as marginal release [78] and range
query [11, 62]. Most FO protocols consist of three steps: Encoding,
Perturbation and Aggregation [61]. We introduce two state-of-the-
art FO protocols in the following.
2.2.1 Generalized Randomized Response (GRR). The GRR algo-
rithm is a generalized version of random response [68].
Encoding. GRR directly perturbs on private value 𝑣 , thus the
encoded value 𝑥𝑖 equals to 𝑣𝑖 for user 𝑖 .
Perturbation. User 𝑖 keeps 𝑣𝑖 with probability 𝑝 = 𝑒
𝜖
𝑒𝜖+|𝐷 |+1 and
randomly chooses 𝑣 ′
𝑖
∈ 𝐷 s.t. 𝑣𝑖 ≠ 𝑣 ′𝑖 with probability 𝑞 = 1𝑒𝜖+|𝐷 |+1 ,
then uploads 𝑥 ′
𝑖
to the server, where 𝑥 ′
𝑖
B Perturb(𝑥𝑖 ).
Aggregation. The aggregator counts howmany times 𝑣 is reported,
denoted by count[𝑣] = ∑𝑁𝑖=1 I{𝑥 ′=𝑣 } . An unbiased estimation of the
frequency of 𝑣 is ˆ𝑓𝑣 =
count[𝑣 ]−𝑁𝑞
𝑁 (𝑝−𝑞) .
Estimation Error. ˆ𝑓𝑣 is an unbiased estimation of the true fre-
quency 𝑓𝑣 [62]. Therefore, the estimation error of GRR originates
from the algorithm variance
VarGRR(𝜖 ) =
|𝐷 | − 2 + 𝑒𝜖
𝑁 (𝑒𝜖 − 1)2 (1)
2.2.2 Optimized Unary Encoding (OUE). OUE [61] is an optimiza-
tion of the basic RAPPOR protocol in [20].
Encoding. User 𝑖 encodes his/her private data into a one-hot
binary vector, i.e., 𝑥𝑖 = [0, 0 . . . , 1, . . . , 0] of length |𝐷 |, where
only the 𝑣𝑖 -th position is 1.
Perturbation. User 𝑖 flips each bit of 𝑥𝑖 based on probabilities 𝑝 =
1
2
and 𝑞 = 1𝑒𝜖+1 as below, while transmitting 1’s and 0’s differently.
1’s (resp., 0’s) keeps with the probability of 𝑝 (resp., 1 − 𝑞) and flips









users and counts the number of occurrences of 1 in each bit, e.g.,
for the 𝑣-th bit, count[𝑣] = ∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑥 ′𝑖 [𝑣]. The count[𝑣] needs to be
corrected to obtain an unbiased estimation
ˆ𝑓 [𝑣] = count[𝑣 ]−𝑁𝑞
𝑁 (𝑝−𝑞) .
Estimation Error. It is proved in [61] that OUE has variance
VarOUE(𝜖) =
4𝑒𝜖
𝑁 (𝑒𝜖 − 1)2 (2)
Both GRR and OUE achieve unbiased estimation of frequency val-
ues. As shown in Equation 1 and Equation 2, OUE has a variance
that is independent of |𝐷 |. For smaller |𝐷 | (such that |𝐷 | − 2 < 3𝑒𝜖 ),
GRR is better; while OUE is superior for larger |𝐷 |.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION AND EXISTING
SOLUTIONS
3.1 Range Query Problem
Woodstock ’18, June 03–05, 2018, Woodstock, NY linkang du, et al.
In addition to range query, marginal release and heavy hitters
are also widely studied under LDP. For marginal release, Kulkarni
et al. [? ] proposed to apply the Fourier Transformation method
and Ren et al. [? ] proposed to apply the Expectation Maximization
methods. Zhang et al. [? ] proposed CALM to strategically choose
sets of attributes and adaptively choose randomization algorithm
to reduce the noise effect. The problem of heavy hitters also at-
tracts lots of investigation [? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ]. Qin et al.[Heavy Hitter
Estimation over Set-Valued Data with Local Differential Privacy]
proposed a two-phase framework LDPMiner to handle set-valued
data. Wang et al. [? ] improved LDPMiner by proposing SVIM and






· · · · · ·
vN 69
Table 5: title1
Age Salary Loan amount
v1 18 150 0
v2 42 5400 49192
v3 27 2310 2194
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
vN 69 3820 1982
Figure 1: An example database containing𝑁 userswith three
attributes: age, salary and loan amount.








, · · · , 𝑣 (𝑚)
𝑖
), with 𝑣 ( 𝑗)
𝑖
representing the
𝑗-th private attribute value owned by user 𝑖 . Denote the domain for
the 𝑗-th item as 𝐷 𝑗 . Given a series of ranges 𝛼 𝑗 , 𝛽 𝑗 ( 𝑗 = 1, 2, · · · ,𝑚
), an𝑚-dim range query can be computed as
𝑅⋂ [𝛼 𝑗 ,𝛽 𝑗 ]𝑚𝑗=1 = 1𝑁
𝑁∑
𝑖=1
I⋂ {𝛼 𝑗 ≤𝑣 ( 𝑗 )𝑖 ≤𝛽 𝑗 }𝑚𝑗=1
where I𝛾 is an indicator function that takes 1 if the predicate 𝛾 is
true and 0 otherwise. Figure 1 gives a running example of range
query. For example, the proportion of people within 20 years to 40
years old constitutes a 1-dim range query, while the ratio of people
within 20 years to 40 years old, with salary less than 5000, and
with loan amount less than 20000 constitutes a 3-dim range query,
where the three dimensions corresponding to age, salary and loan
amount, respectively.
3.2 Hierarchical-Interval Optimized (HIO)
Based on a 𝐵-ary tree, HIO [62] hierarchically decomposes the
entire domain into mutually disjoint subsets called intervals. The
root node represents the entire domain, and the leaf nodes represent
the individual values. Nodes on the same layer represent intervals of
the same granularity. Then, HIO obtains the frequency estimations
of nodes in each layer by theOUE [61] algorithm. When answering
a range query, HIO completely covers the query range by using the
minimum number of intervals from different layers.
For example, when the users’ private attribute domain size |𝐷 | =
8 and tree fanout 𝐵 = 2, the range query [2, 7] can be decomposed
into intervals [2, 3]∪[4, 7]. Then,HIO adds the estimated frequency
values of the two intervals above to get the answer of a range
query. For general query with range length 𝑟 , HIO can answer it
with at most 2(𝐵 − 1) log𝐵 |𝐷 | intervals. Compared with directly
using FO mechanisms, HIO can effectively reduce the number of
intervals used when answering queries, thus substantially reducing
the cumulative error caused by adding noisy frequency values of
intervals within the range.
However, HIO has two weaknesses that limit its applicability in
practice. 1) HIO inserts the same level of noise into the estimated
frequencies of all the intervals. For nodes with small intervals,
the perturbation noise often overwhelms the true frequency val-
ues thus degrading the utility of the entire algorithm. 2) In the
multi-dimensional scene, the number of tree layers increases ex-
ponentially with the number of dimensions. For high-dimensional
scenarios, the query error increases extremely with the excessive
small value nodes.
3.3 Discrete Haar Wavelet Transform (DHT)
DHT [11] imposes a full binary tree structure over the domain, and
encodes the user private value 𝑣 into a set ofHaar wavelet coefficients.
The motivation underlying DHT [11] is that the calculation of a
length-𝑟 range query uses only a smaller number of estimated
values in the Haar wavelet domain, comparing to apply FO directly.
DHT also faces several limitations. 1) Similar toHIO,DHT inserts
the same level of noise into all estimated Haar wavelet coefficients.
For some coefficients with low values, noise tends to skew the
estimated coefficients causing query error to increase. 2) It is mainly
designed for 1-dim scenario, thus limiting its application in practice.
3.4 Consistent Adaptive Local Marginal (CALM)
CALM [78] is a marginal release LDP protocol, which can con-
struct the joint distribution of𝑚 attributes with privacy protection
guarantee. Instead of directly estimating all marginal tables, CALM
strategically chooses the size and the number of marginal tables,
based on which all the marginal tables can be reconstructed. We
notice thatCALM can be used to answer range queries. More specif-
ically, to answer a multi-dimensional range query, CALM can sum
up the reconstructed marginals included in the query.
However, when the domain size |𝐷 | is large, CALM needs to sum
up extensive noisy marginals to answer a query, which is likely to
inject a large amount of noise to the true answer.
3.5 Hybird-Dimensional Grids (HDG)
HDG [73] is the state-of-the-artmethod to answermulti-dimensional
range query under LDP. The main idea of HDG is to carefully buck-
etize the 2-dim domains of all attribute pairs into coarse 2-dim grids
and then estimate the answer of a higher dimensional range query
from the answers of the associated 2-dim range queries. To capture
the fine-grained distribution information for users’ data, HDG also
introduces 1-dim grids to offer finer-grained distribution informa-
tion on each attribute and combines information from 1-dim and
2-dim grids to answer range queries.
HDG also faces several limitations. 1) The equal granularity grids
ofHDG cannot handle various distributions of users’ data. For skew-
distributed datasets, whose data is concentrated in a small part of
the whole domain, noise error or non-uniform error dominates in
some grids thus degrading the utility. 2) Using 1-dim grids may
destroy the correlation between attributes.
3.6 Remarks
To overcome the limitations of the state-of-the-art low-dimensional
mechanisms (HIO,DHT) and high-dimensionalmechanisms (CALM,
HDG), we aim to achieve the following two design goals: 1) find
a reasonable decomposition for the domain to avoid introducing
excessive noise; 2) the designed mechanism can be extended to
multi-dimensional scenarios, with better query accuracy than ex-
isting algorithms. Motivated by these goals, we propose AHEAD,
which differs from the existing work in several major aspects: 1)
AHEAD is an adaptive and dynamic algorithm, compared to the
existing algorithms with static frameworks; 2) AHEAD reduces the
impact of noise on small value nodes by merging intervals. 3) The
designed mechanism can migrate from 1-dim to multi-dimensional
scenarios. Next, we will illustrate the motivation and design of
AHEAD in detail.
4 AHEAD: ADAPTIVE HIERARCHICAL
DECOMPOSITION
4.1 Motivation and Overview
In this subsection, we use an example to illustrate the limitations of
the existing algorithms and the rationality of AHEAD. As shown in
Figure 2, the tables on the left show the intervals with corresponding
real frequency values. For instance, the true frequency value of
interval [0, 1] is 0, meaning that there is no user data reside in this
interval. Then, the middle tables display the frequency values of the
intervals, separately estimated by different strategies. 𝜎2 represents
the variance of the noise introduced in the perturbation process.
The remaining part on the right shows the process of answering
the query based on the estimated values.
Firstly, we focus on the process of the baseline strategy, such













𝑛# [2,3] 0.05 +𝑋
𝑛B [0,3] 0.05 +𝑋
Questioner
Questioner
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦( 0, 5 ) = ?
Answer: 0.5 + 3𝑋
Query error: 3𝑋
Query: Frequency( [0, 5]) = ?
Answer: 0.5 + 2𝑋
Query error: 2𝑋
𝑛$ [4,5] 0.45 +𝑋





𝑛( [6,7] 0.5 +𝑋
𝑛$ [4,5] 0.45 +𝑋
𝑛# [2,3] 0.05 Ada tive 




𝑛B [0,3] 0.05 +𝑋
𝑛( [6,7] 0.5 +𝑋
Questioner
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦( 0, 5 ) = ?
Answer: 0.5 + 2𝑋
Query error: 2𝑋
𝑛# [2,3] 0.05 Baseline
strategy
𝑛# [2,3] 0.05 +𝑋 Questioner







𝑛( [6,7] 0.5 +𝑋
𝑛$ [4,5] 0.45 +𝑋
𝑛# [2,3] 0.05 Adaptive 
strategy




𝑛B [0,3] 0.05 +𝑋
𝑛( [6,7] 0.5 +𝑋
Questioner







𝑛# [2,3] 0.05 Baseline
strategy
𝑛# [2,3] 0.05 + 𝜎$ Questioner
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦( 0, 5 ) = ?











𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦( 0, 5 ) = ?
Answer: 0.5 + 2𝜎$
Query error: 2𝜎$
𝑛' [0,1] 0+𝜎$
𝑛( [6,7] 0.5 + 𝜎$
𝑛$ [4,5] 0.45 + 𝜎$
𝑛$ [4,5] 0.45 + 𝜎$
𝑛B [0,3] 0.05 + 𝜎$
𝑛( [6,7] 0.5 + 𝜎$
Figure 2: Baseline strategy vs. Adaptive strategy.
frequency of each interval. Each estimated value integrates a noise
error by the FOmechanism tomeet the LDP guarantees. For interval
[0, 1], its true value is 0, meaning that the estimated values for these
intervals are completely filled with noise. When answering a range
query, such as 𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 ( [0, 5]), the questioner wants to know
the frequency value of interval [0, 5]. The answer of the baseline
strategy is 0.5 + 3𝜎2. It is worthy noting that interval [0, 1] does
not contribute to the query answer but bring the same degree of
noise, which reduces the query accuracy of the existing algorithms.
On the other hand, for the adaptive strategy, as if we know the
true frequency values of the intervals, we can combine the intervals
𝑛0 and 𝑛1 and estimate a single value for 𝑛𝑝 . When answering the
same range query 𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 ( [0, 5]), the answer of the adaptive
strategy is 0.5 + 2𝜎2, which reduces the noise error by 30% com-
pared to the baseline method. We attenuate the noise error for the
intervals with small frequency values, and the adaptive strategy
works better in this case.
The combination of intervals will reduce the impact of noise
on intervals with small frequency values. However, when a query
falls within an interval, the answer has to be approximated by
the assumption about the distribution within the interval. Making
the uniform distribution assumption is a dominant strategy [29],
where the value of each record in the interval is the same. When
the assumption is not satisfied, it leads to a non-uniform error. For
instance, if the questioner wants to know 𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 ( [2, 3]), the
answer of the adaptive strategy is calculated from the frequency
value of interval [0, 3], i.e., the half of the frequency value of interval
[0, 3]. Compared with the baseline strategy, the adaptive strategy
reduces the noise error from 𝜎2 to 𝜎
2
2
, while it also brings non-
uniform error 0.05 − 0.05
2
= 0.025.
Adaptivity reduces the noise error by merging intervals, while
introducing the non-uniform error by assuming uniformity. There-
fore, to reduce the overall query error, we aim to find the optimal
domain decomposition through balancing these two errors. How-
ever, finding the optimal partition for 2-dim datasets is diffcult [45],
which is even worse with privacy constraint. Inspired by the above
example, we propose a multi-phase hierarchy based recursive par-
titioning strategy (detailed in Section 4.2) that seeks to balance the
errors and address the limitations of the existing solutions.
4.2 Workflow of AHEAD
In this subsection, we show the workflow of AHEAD with an ex-
ample as shown in Figure 3. In this example, the aggregator wants
to complete the range query task about the user’s salary based
on AHEAD. The salary data is bucketized into 8 ordinal levels, i.e.,
① User partition !? [0,7] 1













































































(&)*+ ,- = 1
(&)*+ ,- = 2
(&)*+ ,- = 3
Domain 
Decomposition :I
Perturbed data of group 2
Domain 
Decomposition :A
Perturbed data of group 3
Figure 3: Workflow of AHEAD. From left to right, the four steps in the AHEAD algorithm, i.e., user partition, noisy frequency
construction, new decomposition generation and post-processing, are shown respectively. AHEAD answers the range queries
based on the tree in the rightmost sub-figure.
domain size |𝐷 | = 8. The tree fanout 𝐵 = 2, meaning that each node
of the AHEAD tree has at most two child nodes. In each node of the
AHEAD prototype tree, 𝑛𝑖 represents the node index, [𝑎, 𝑏] repre-
sents the node’s interval, and
ˆ𝑓𝑖 represents the estimated frequency
value. It is worth noting that AHEAD adopts the sampling principle
[11], i.e., partitioning users into groups with each group using the
full privacy budget). Sampling principle can significantly reduce the
overall error in local setting [46, 61, 64] (refer to more details in
Appendix A). Below, we divide the workflow of AHEAD into four
steps and describe the steps in detail.
Step 1: User Partition (UP). As shown in the left dashed box
in Figure 3, the aggregator determines the number of partitions
𝑐 , where 𝑐 = log𝐵 |𝐷 | is set to ensure that users are assigned to
each layer of the AHEAD tree. The users randomly choose the
group number in range [1, 2, 3, · · · , 𝑐]. In addition, the users can also
leverage their public information to select groups, such as the time
of account registration, user ID, etc. The partition process should
ensure that each group is representative of the overall population
with a similar number of users.
Step 2: Noisy Frequency Construction (NFC). In the middle
dashed box, the aggregator first establishes a root node 𝑛0 repre-
senting the entire domain. After that, the aggregator performs the
initial decomposition of the domain, i.e., dividing the entire domain
into 𝐵 equal-sized intervals, then attaches the interval nodes to
the root node 𝑛0. The children of the root node represents a way
to divide the whole domain, denoted as domain decomposition
𝐸1. The aggregator selects the first group of users and sends the
decomposition 𝐸1 and privacy budget 𝜖 to them. Each user in the
first group projects his/her private value 𝑣 onto the intervals of
𝐸1 and uploads the projected value of 𝑣 via OUE. After receiving
users’ reports, the server uses the aggregation algorithm to obtain
the estimated frequency distribution 𝐹1, which represents the ratio
of users falling within each node’s interval.
Step 3: New Decomposition Generation (NDG). The aggrega-





old \ and decides whether to divide the corresponding interval
of 𝐸1 = {[0, 3], [4, 7]} further. To be specific, since ˆ𝑓2 is greater
than the setting \ , the corresponding interval [4, 7] in 𝐸1 should
be divided into 𝐵 equal-sized sub-intervals [4, 5], [6, 7]. While the
frequency value
ˆ𝑓1 of node 𝑛1 is not greater than \ , interval [0, 3]
does not need further partition. For the new interval nodes, we
attach them to the corresponding parent interval nodes. When all
the elements in 𝐹1 are traversed completely, we can obtain a new
set of intervals serving as decomposition 𝐸2.
Then, the aggregator sends decomposition 𝐸2 to the second
group of users and obtains the estimated frequency distribution 𝐹2.
The aggregator repeats the above steps until all user groups are
applied and gets an AHEAD prototype tree as shown in the middle
dashed box of Figure 3. Since the estimated frequency is less than
the threshold \ , AHEAD will not decompose the intervals [0, 3]
and [6, 7] in subsequent interactions. To guarantee LDP, [0, 3] and
[6, 7] should be estimated by all groups of users.
While constructing the prototype tree, AHEAD estimates each
layer separately, which does not consider the constraint of fre-
quency values in the tree, i.e., the sum of the child nodes’ frequency
values is equal to that of their parent node. Therefore, in Step 4, we
further boost the accuracy of AHEAD by conducting non-negativity
and weighted averaging between the nodes’ estimations.
Step 4: Post-processing (PP). The post-processing module con-
tains two steps: non-negativity and weighted averaging.
Firstly, AHEAD processes the nodes in the same layer by Norm-
Sub [65] to ensure that the estimated frequencies of nodes are
non-negative and the sum of the frequencies is equal to 1. AHEAD
converts the negative value into 0 and calculates the total difference
between the sum of positive values and 1. Next, each positive value
subtracts the average difference, which is obtained by dividing the
total difference by the number of positive estimated values. The
non-negativity process repeats until all values become non-negative.
Then, from bottom to top, AHEAD calculates the weighted av-
erage between non-leaf node 𝑛 and its children to update the es-
timated frequencies of 𝑛, i.e., reducing the added noise by fusing
multiple estimations of 𝑛. For a non-root node 𝑛:
˜𝑓 (𝑛) =
{
_1 ˆ𝑓 (𝑛) + _2
∑
𝑢∈𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 (𝑛) ˆ𝑓 (𝑢), if u is a leaf node
_1 ˆ𝑓 (𝑛) + _2
∑
𝑢∈𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 (𝑛) ˜𝑓 (𝑢), o.w.
(3)
The weights _1 and _2 are inversely proportional to the variance of
the estimates, i.e., _1 =
Var𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 (𝑛)
Var𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 (𝑛)+Var(𝑛) and _2 =
Var(𝑛)
Var𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 (𝑛)+Var(𝑛) ,
whereVar𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 (𝑛) represents the sum of node𝑛’s children variances,
and Var𝑛 indicates the variance of node 𝑛. ˜𝑓 indicates the post-
processed version of
ˆ𝑓 and will be used to answer queries. The
weighted average process can minimize the magnitude of noise as
shown in the following theorem. The proof of Theorem 4.1 can be
found in Appendix C.
Theorem 4.1. Using Equation 3 to combine the frequencies of child
nodes, the node 𝑛 can achieve the minimal updated variance.
Finally, from top to bottom, AHEAD decomposes the frequency
value recursively under the uniform distribution assumption of the
node’s interval to obtain a complete tree (shown in the rightmost
sub-figure of Figure 3), which will be used to answer range queries.
4.3 Privacy and Utility Analysis
Privacy Guarantee. AHEAD is sequentially interactive [2, 15, 35,
36, 38], i.e., each user communicates once (Step 2 in Section 4.2)
but the randomization depends on earlier user’s messages (Step 3
in Section 4.2). Since the private data of each user is transmitted
to the aggregator once via OUE with privacy budget 𝜖 (no other
information of the users is leaked), we claim thatAHEAD rigorously
satisfies 𝜖-LDP and the proof is deferred to Appendix B due to the
space limitation.
Error Analysis. The overall error between the true query answer
and the estimated answer originates from three sources of errors.
Noise and Sampling Errors originate from the OUE’s perturba-
tion and the user sampling processes. As shown in Section 2.2.2, al-
thoughOUE can get an unbiased estimation of the frequency values,
there is still an estimation variance caused by perturbation. In addi-
tion, AHEAD divides users into 𝑐 groups and uses each user group
to represent the frequency estimation from the entire population.
Based on the analysis in [73], the sampling error is a constant which
is much smaller than the inserted noise. Since each user randomly
chooses one of the 𝑐 groups to report private data, the population
of each group approximates to
𝑁
𝑐 . By Equation 2, the variance of
perturbed noise 𝑋 is proportional to the number of groups 𝑐 , i.e.,
𝜎2 = 𝑐 · 4𝑒𝜖
𝑁 (𝑒𝜖−1)2 . Due to the threshold setting, some fine-grained
intervals’ frequency values may not be directly estimated. For the
non-estimated intervals, their frequency values should be calcu-
lated from the larger intervals, i.e., the higher-level intervals (such
as parent nodes) in the AHEAD tree. If a non-estimated interval’s
frequency value is calculated from a larger interval whose size is 𝑘
times of the non-estimated interval’s size, AHEAD assigns 1
𝑘
of the
large interval’s value to the non-estimated interval. Thus, the noise
error of the non-estimated interval can be viewed as originating




Non-uniform Error arises from some intervals whose values are
approximated by larger intervals’ values in the AHEAD tree. For
a non-estimated interval 𝑛 whose true frequency value is 𝑓𝑛 , the
size of the larger interval is 𝑘 times that of 𝑛 (𝑘 is the same as that
in the noise and sampling errors part). During the calculation, it
is assumed that the private values in the larger interval satisfy a




, where 𝑓𝑝 is the true frequency value of the larger
interval. If the values in interval 𝑝 satisfy the uniform distribution,
there is no non-uniform error, i.e., 𝑓𝑛 =
𝑓𝑝
𝑘
. When the values in
Algorithm 1 1-dim AHEAD Tree Construction
Input: All users’ value set 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑁 }, attribute domain
𝐷 , tree fanout 𝐵, privacy budget 𝜖 , threshold \
Output: AHEAD Tree 𝑇
1: 𝑐 = log𝐵 |𝐷 |
2: // Step 1: User partition
3: Randomly divide users into 𝑐 parts {𝑉1,𝑉2, . . . ,𝑉𝑐 }
4: Create the root node of tree𝑇 with initial interval 𝑒0
0
= [1, |𝐷 |]
and 𝑇 . node(𝑒0
0
).𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 = 1
5: for 𝑖 from 1 to 𝑐 do
6: // Step 2: New decomposition generation
7: for 𝑗 , node in enumerate(𝑇 . node(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑖 − 1)) do
8: if node. frequency > \ then
9: Divide interval 𝑒𝑖−1
𝑗
into 𝐵 disjoint intervals {𝑒𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑘
}











17: // Step 3: Noisy frequency construction
18: 𝐹 = FO(𝑉𝑖 ,𝑇 . node(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑖) . interval, 𝜖)
19: for 𝑘 , node in enumerate 𝑇 . node(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑖) do
20: 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒. frequency = 𝐹 [𝑘]
21: end for
22: end for
23: // Step 4: Post-processing
24: Run Algorithm 2
25: Return 𝑇
interval 𝑝 do not meet the uniform distribution assumption, the
deviation of the interval 𝑛’s frequency value is |𝑓𝑛 − 𝑓𝑝𝑘 |. Thus, the
non-uniform error is influenced by the true distribution of the in-
terval 𝑝 . If the distribution is closed to the uniform distribution, the
non-uniform error becomes small. Otherwise, the non-uniform er-
ror will increase, and the upper bound of the uniform error depends
on the true frequency value 𝑓𝑝 , i.e. |𝑓𝑝 − 𝑓𝑝𝑘 |. For the entire domain,
when the frequencies are more uniformly distributed across nodes,
AHEAD behaves better owing to smaller non-uniform errors.
4.4 Selection of 𝐵 and \
The most important parameters of AHEAD are tree fanout 𝐵 and
threshold \ . Since AHEAD has already rigorously satisfied LDP
guarantees (recall Theorem B.1 in Appendix B), we aim to explore
the settings of 𝐵 and \ so that the overall utility performance of
AHEAD can be maximized. Due to the partition strategy mentioned
above and a large scale of users in actual scenarios (𝑁 > 105), we
assume that each group has an equal number of users. Recalling
the error analysis in Section 4.3, we focus on the noise error and
non-uniform error, which dominate the overall estimation error.
Choosing \ . Intuitively, our goal in selecting the parameters of
AHEAD is to balance the two errors, so that AHEAD can achieve an
outstanding performance. For a set of parameters, i.e., tree fanout
Algorithm 2 Post-processing
Input: AHEAD tree 𝑇 , tree fanout 𝐵
Output: AHEAD tree 𝑇
1: for 𝑖 from 1 to 𝑐 do
2: norm_sub(𝑇 . node(level = i) . frequency)
3: end for
4: for 𝑗 from 𝑐 − 1 to 1 do
5: for _, node in enumerate 𝑇 . node(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑗) do
6: 𝑓1 = node.frequency, 𝑓2 =
∑
node. children(). frequency
7: node.frequency = _1 𝑓1 + _2 𝑓2
8: end for
9: end for
10: for 𝑘 from 1 to 𝑐 do
11: for _, node in enumerate 𝑇 . node(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑘) do
12: if node.children() == None then:
13: node . add_children()




𝐵, privacy budget 𝜖 , user scale 𝑁 and the number of groups 𝑐 , the
decomposition threshold \ setting follows the formula below.
\ =
√
(𝐵 + 1)Var, (4)
where Var is equal to 4𝑒
𝜖𝑐
𝑁 (𝑒𝜖−1)2 , i.e., the variance of each estimated
frequency value.
The analysis to support Equation 4 is as follows. Recalling the
new decomposition generation step in Section 4.2, AHEAD divides
each interval separately by comparing the estimated value with the
threshold. Therefore, our analysis can focus on one of the interval
nodes of the AHEAD tree. Suppose we have a node 𝑛 with a true
frequency value 𝑓 and use 𝑓1, 𝑓2, · · · , 𝑓𝐵 to denote the true frequency
values of its children. Without loss of generality, one of 𝑛’s children
frequency value is [𝑓 and the sum of others is (1 − [) 𝑓 , where
[ ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter [ is determined by the distribution of the
users’ data. When the distribution is far away from the uniform
distribution, [ closes to 0 or 1, which is the boundary of its value
domain. Otherwise, [ closes to 1
𝐵
. Here, we consider two different
strategies mentioned in Section 4.1 to estimate the frequency values
of 𝑛’s children. Firstly, we use the baseline strategy used in HIO to
obtain their frequency values and the expected overall estimation
error can be calculated below.
E [Err1] = E
[
( ˆ𝑓1 − 𝑓1)2 + ( ˆ𝑓2 − 𝑓2)2 + · · · + ( ˆ𝑓𝐵 − 𝑓𝐵)2
]
= E
[(𝑓1 + 𝑋1 − 𝑓1)2 + · · · + (𝑓𝐵 + 𝑋𝐵 − 𝑓𝐵)2]
= E
[
𝐵 · 𝑋 2] = 𝐵E [𝑋 2] = 𝐵Var (5)
In the derivation of Equation 5,OUE is conducted once to obtain
users’ data distribution over 𝐵 intervals in each layer. 𝑋𝑖 represents
the perturbed noise added to the frequency of the 𝑖-th sub-interval.
For each layer, the number of users in Equation 2 is the same for all
intervals, i.e., E[𝑋 2
𝑖
] = 𝑂 (𝑐/𝑁 ) for any 𝑖 . Leveraging the adaptive
strategy used in AHEAD, we estimate the frequency value of node
𝑛 and assign the average as the child nodes’ values. Then, we obtain
the expected estimation error.
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( (𝐵 − 1) 𝑓 2 + Var) (8)
In the derivation of Equation 8, the error of each child node contains
noise error and non-uniform error. For instance, the squared error












We let Equation 8 < Equation 5 to ensure that the adaptive strat-
egy has a lower overall estimation error than that of the baseline
strategy. Then we get the inequality as follows.
𝑓 <
√
(𝐵 + 1)Var (9)
We further calculate the frequency values of the nodes on node
𝑛’s subtree and the adaptive strategy always outranks the baseline
strategy. Based on the analysis for Equation 9, if the frequency value
of a node meets Equation 9, then it cannot be divided. Otherwise,
it needs to be further divided. Therefore, we set the threshold \ =√
(𝐵 + 1)Var to guarantee that AHEAD does not divide the nodes
with small frequency values and reduces the estimation error than
the baseline strategy.
It is worth noting that \ can be less optimal after the post-
processing step (step 4 in Section 4.2). However, post-processing is
correlated with the tree structure, which is unknown when choos-
ing \ . Therefore, post-processing is hard to be incorporated in the
theoretical analysis of \ . Our current analysis of \ is independent of
the tree structure (and the input data as well), making the derived
\ generally applicable to any input data. In the practical implemen-
tation of AHEAD, we only have access to the estimated frequency
value
ˆ𝑓 , i.e., the true frequency value 𝑓 with a random noise vari-
able 𝑋 . Since OUE is an unbiased protocol, the expected value of
ˆ𝑓 is equal to 𝑓 . Thus, we still use \ as the threshold in AHEAD
and provide a comprehensive validation of threshold choice in
Appendix G.
Choosing 𝐵. In general, 𝐵 is used to balance the tree height and
the number of nodes required to answer the query. Previous studies
[11, 62] select the optimal fanout 𝐵 around 4 when only consid-
ering noise and sampling errors. Different from [11, 62], AHEAD
introduces non-uniform error in the process of merging intervals.
Compared to the 𝐵 choice of previous studies, we set 𝐵 = 2 consid-
ering non-uniformity and provide the analysis in the following.
For a node 𝑛 with a true frequency 𝑓 (𝑓 < \ ), AHEAD does
not further decompose the interval of node 𝑛 due to the threshold
setting, where the children of node 𝑛 can not directly get esti-
mation frequency values in noisy frequency construction (Step 2
in Section 4.2). From Equation 2, the variance of the perturbed
noise 𝑋 on node 𝑛 is proportional to the number of groups 𝑐 , i.e.,
𝜎2 = 𝑐 · 4𝑒𝜖
𝑁 (𝑒𝜖−1)2 . To obtain a complete tree for answering queries,
AHEAD assigns 1
𝐵
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Figure 4: 2-dimAHEAD algorithm,where the decomposition is implemented by decomposing both dimensions simultaneously.
child nodes in post-processing (Step 4 in Section 4.2). Then, we can
obtain the noise error of node 𝑛’s child as 𝑋
𝐵
. Since we have no
prior knowledge of the data distribution, for non-uniform error, we
consider the worst case, i.e., the non-uniform error is 𝑓 − 𝑓
𝐵
. Con-
sidering 𝑓 should be close to the threshold, the expected estimation
error can be expressed as

















+ ( 𝐵 − 1
𝐵
)2 (𝐵 + 1)𝑐𝜎2
= (𝜎2 ln |𝐷 |) 𝐵 + (𝐵 − 1)
2 (𝐵 + 1)
𝐵2 ln𝐵
, (10)
where |𝐷 | is the domain size of attribute, 𝜖 is the privacy budget,
𝑁 is the user scale and 𝑐 is the number of user groups. Letting
the derivative of Equation 10 to 0, we get 𝐵 = 0.6 and 𝐵 = 2.2.
Since the tree fanout 𝐵 is an integer greater than 1 and the value of
Equation 10 is smaller at 𝐵 = 2 than that at 𝐵 = 3, we select 𝐵 = 2
for AHEAD and compare the query error with 𝐵 = 4 [11, 62]. We
empirically validate the effectiveness of this parameter setting in
Section 5.
4.5 Extension to Multi-dimensional Settings
2-dim Range Query. Let us first look at the 2-dim scenario. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that all attributes have the same
domain 𝐷 = {1, 2, · · · , 𝑑}, where 𝑑 is a power of the fanout 𝐵 (if not
in real setting, we can simply add some dummy values to achieve
it). The main difference between 1-dim and 2-dim AHEAD is the de-
composition process (lines 4, 9 of Algorithm 1). For 1-dim scenarios,
AHEAD hierarchically divides the entire domain, which is an inter-
val [1, |𝐷 |], into different sub-intervals with varying granularity.
While for 2-dim scenarios, the entire domain becomes a square area
[1, |𝐷 |] × [1, |𝐷 |]. AHEAD generates different granularity 2-dim
grids to decompose the entire domain. The pseudo-code of 2-dim
AHEAD can be found in Appendix D.
An example of 2-dim AHEAD is shown in Figure 4. The domain
size of the user private attribute is 8 × 8 and the tree fanout 𝐵 = 4.
Similar to 1-dim scenarios, 2-dim AHEAD also contains four steps
to capture the users’ data distribution.
• Step 1: User Partition (UP). The users randomly choose the
group number in range [1, 2, 3, · · · , 𝑐], where 𝑐 = log𝐵 |𝐷 |2.
• Step 2: Noisy Frequency Construction (NFC). Then, the ag-
gregator divides the entire domain into 𝐵 equal-size square areas
and sends the initial decomposition of the domain to the first
group of users. The users project their private data into the initial
decomposition and reports their data through OUE. The server
uses the aggregation algorithm to obtain the estimated frequency
distribution, which represents the ratio of users falling within
each sub-domain.
• Step 3: New Decomposition Generation (NDG). After that,
the aggregator compares each frequency value with a threshold
\ and decides whether to divide the corresponding sub-domain
further. Repeating the NFC and the NDG processes, AHEAD
recursively decomposes the domain and constructs the AHEAD
prototype tree.
• Step 4: Post-processing (PP). Finally, AHEAD conducts the
non-negativity process within each layer and the weighted av-
eraging process between two adjacent layers to further reduce
the estimated error. Based on uniform distribution assumption,
AHEAD obtains a complete tree to answer queries.
As shown in the right part of Figure 4, In order to reduce the query
error, which increases with the number of nodes used, AHEAD
prefers to use coarse-grained nodes to answer a query. For example,
AHEAD answers a 2-dim query [0, 5]×[0, 5]. AHEAD searches from
the top to the bottom layer of the tree and calculates the sum of
the fully covered sub-domains’ frequencies. The query completely
covers the area of [0, 3] × [0, 3] of the top layer and five areas
[0, 1] × [4, 5], [2, 3] × [4, 5], [4, 5] × [4, 5], [4, 5] × [0, 1], [4, 5] × [2, 3]
of the middle layer (these areas are highlighted in blue), thus the
query answer is ( ˜𝑓1 + ˜𝑓9 + ˜𝑓11 + ˜𝑓13 + ˜𝑓14 + ˜𝑓4/4).
For the 2-dim range query, we set 𝐵 = 22, i.e., the 𝐵 of each
dimension is 2. As a comparison, we also provide the results of
𝐵 = 42 in the experiment. Since the derivation of \ does not involve
dimension changes, we still select \ according to Equation 4.
High-dimensional Range Query. AHEAD can be extended to
higher dimensions in two ways.
• Direct Estimation (DE). Based on a tree with fanout 𝐵 = 2𝑚 ,
AHEAD decomposes𝑚 dimensions simultaneously. For instance,
AHEAD treats the 3-dim domain as a cube, and then aggregates
the frequencies of sub-cubes with different granularities to an-
swer queries. With the threshold setting of Equation 4, AHEAD
can well control the overall estimation errors of sub-domains.
However, the number of leaf nodes increases exponentially with
dimension, which makes the query answer process extremely
time-consuming on high-dimensional datasets.
• Leveraging Low-dimensional Estimation (LLE). To solve the sub-
domain explosion caused by the rise of data dimension, LLE
combines the attributes in pairs, and then constructs a 2-dim
AHEAD tree for each attribute pair. When answering an𝑚-dim
query, LLE constructs a query set with the associated 2𝑚 queries
(recall Algorithm 6 in Appendix F). Then, taking the 2-dim fre-
quency as constraints, LLE estimates the frequency values of
all the 2
𝑚
queries by the maximum entropy optimization. For
self-containment, we include its description and pseudo-code in
Appendix F. Previous methods also used the maximum entropy
optimization to effectively extend the low-dimensional mecha-
nism to high-dimensional scenarios. PriView [52] proposes to
construct low-dimensional views, i.e., 2, 3-dim marginal tables,
and apply maximum entropy optimization to reconstruct higher-
way marginals from views. In this way, PriView constructs mar-
ginal tables for𝑚-dim data with high data utility while satisfying
DP. CALM [78] migrates the idea of PriView to LDP, which also
achieves high accuracy for the problem of marginal release under
LDP. HDG [73] groups all attributes in pairs and estimates the
frequency distribution of user data on each attribute pair (2-dim
grid). Then, HDG obtains the answer of a higher dimensional
range query from the answers of the associated 2-dim range
queries.
The implementation of the DE method is relatively simple, and
the number of user partitions will not increase with the increase of
the dimension. However, the AHEAD tree with DE might be very
large in high-dimensional scenarios, making the tree construction
and query answering process time-consuming. Compared toDE, the
LLE method combines the attributes in pairs, and then constructs a
2-dim AHEAD tree for each attribute pair, which makes the scale
of each tree not too large. We empirically show the performance of
these two strategies and discuss how to choose between them in
Section 5.4.
4.6 Discussion
AHEAD is similar to PrivTree [76], i.e., a general approach for hi-
erarchical decomposition on private data, where PrivTree also 1)
generates tree 𝑇 by recursively splitting a root node 𝑛0 whose sub-
domain covers the entire data domain 𝐷 , and 2) decides whether
a node 𝑛 should be decomposed based on a noisy frequency of 𝑛.
However, AHEAD differs from PrivTree in several important as-
pects. It is worth noting that these differences are mainly due to the
fact that these two methods work under different privacy require-
ments. That is, PrivTreeworks in a centralized setting of differential
privacy, while AHEAD works in a local setting.
• PrivTree can directly access all the information in the server,
where PrivTree operates on the dataset, adds noise, and then
derives the answers. AHEAD only has access to the noisy data
uploaded by users, and then aggregates the reports to answer
queries.
• In PrivTree, each frequency is estimated using the information of
all users, with a split privacy budget. While in the local setting,
partitioning users into groups and estimating the frequency with
an entire privacy budget can obtain a higher data utility [11, 62,
Table 2: Summary of datasets.
Dataset Distribution Scale Field Type
Salaries – 148,654 employee salary real
BlackFriday – 537,577 shopping real
Loan – 2,260,668 online loan real
Financial – 6,362,620 fraud detection synthetic
Cauchy Cauchy – – synthetic
Zipf Zipf (power-law) – – synthetic
Gaussian Gaussian – – synthetic
Laplacian Laplacian – – synthetic
78]. Therefore, in AHEAD, each frequency is estimated by only a
subset of users, with an entire privacy budget.
• Based on the above two differences, besides noise errors inPrivTree,
AHEAD further considers the sampling and non-uniform errors.
• In PrivTree, the tree fanout 𝐵 is not considered in error analysis.
In comparison, AHEAD derives the 𝐵 setting through the analysis
of noise errors and non-uniform errors.
• For high-dimensional scenes, PrivTree adopts direct estimation
(DE) to extend low-dimensional strategies, while AHEAD lever-
ages a more efficient way, i.e., leveraging low-dimensional esti-
mation (LLE).
5 EVALUATION
To validate the effectiveness of AHEAD, we evaluate its perfor-
mance on multiple real-world datasets and compare AHEAD with
the state-of-the-art methods such as HIO [62] (1-dim query), DHT
[11] (1-dim query), CALM [78] (1, 2-dim query) and HDG [73] (2-
dim and high-dimensional query) in balancing utility and privacy.
We also provide a detailed complexity analysis of the algorithms
used in our evaluation in Appendix E.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Environment. All our evaluations are conducted on a PC with
Intel Xeon Platinum 8269@2.5GHz and 32GB memory.
Datasets. In our experiments, we use 3 real-world datasets and
5 synthetic datasets to evaluate the performance of AHEAD, and
Table 2 provides an overview of all datasets. The detailed informa-
tion about the four datasets, i.e., Salaries, BlackFriday, Loan and
Financial, is demonstrated in Appendix H.
We generate 1-dim datasets by sampling data from the Cauchy
(𝑥0 = 0, 𝛾 = 1), Zipf (𝛼 = 1.1), Gaussian (` = 0, 𝜎2 = 1) and
Laplacian (` = 0, _2 = 1/2) distribution respectively, as prior works
did [11, 73, 75]. The multi-dimensional datasets are synthesized
from multivariate Gaussian and Laplacian distribution with mean
0, standard deviation 1 [73].
Metrics. To quantify the performance of AHEAD, we use the
MSE (mean square error) widely used in literature [11, 65, 75] to
measure the deviation between estimated and true values. For each
experimental setting, we compute the MSE of 200 query results, and
then compute the mean and std among 20 repetitions. In addition,
we also provide a 95% confidence interval to reflect the deviations
between MSEs.
Competitors. For a fair comparison, the HIO [62], DHT [11],
CALM [78] and HDG [73] methods are applied with the same pa-
rameter settings as in the original papers. We also plot the MSE of
(a) Loan, |𝐷 | = 256, vary 𝜖 (b) Financial, |𝐷 | = 512, vary 𝜖 (c) BlackFriday, |𝐷 | = 1028, vary 𝜖 (d) Salaries, |𝐷 | = 2048, vary 𝜖
Figure 5: The MSE of different methods with privacy budget varying from 0.1 to 1.5. The results are shown in log scale.
the Uniform method (denoted as Uni) in 1, 2-dim scenes, which al-
ways obtains the query answer from a uniform distribution. Clearly,
if the performance of one method is worse than Uni, the query an-
swer from that method is meaningless. For high-dimensional range
query, we take HDG as the baseline method.
5.2 Evaluation for 1-dim Range Query
We evaluate the effectiveness of AHEAD under various values of
privacy budgets. Specifically, we consider privacy budget 𝜖 varying
from 0.1 (representing high privacy protection) to 1.5 (represent-
ing low privacy protection) [11, 78]. Figure 5 illustrates the MSE
comparison between AHEAD and existing algorithms [11, 62, 78]
for 1-dim queries. For each plot, we vary the privacy budget 𝜖 on
the X-axis and show the corresponding MSE on the Y-axis. Each
histogram in the plots shows the average MSE of 20 repeated ex-
periments with the error bar representing the standard deviation.
From Figure 5, we have the following observations. 1) TheMSE of
AHEAD is smaller than its counterparts throughout the experiment
datasets. Recalling Equation 9 in Section 4.4, for the nodes with
frequency values less than the threshold, AHEADwith the adaptive
strategy has a smaller overall estimation error than the counter-
parts that employ the baseline strategy. 2) AHEAD obtains different
performance over various datasets. For the Salaries dataset, AHEAD
achieves significant advantages over previous methods across the
entire range of privacy budget, where the MSE of AHEAD is almost
one order of magnitude smaller than state-of-the-art methods. For
the Loan dataset, AHEAD is slightly better than DHT. We speculate
that this is mainly because these two datasets have quite different
distributions, such as more sub-domains with small frequency val-
ues (less than the threshold) on the Salaries dataset compared to
the Loan dataset, which causes AHEAD to behave differently on
these two datasets.
In addition, the performance of AHEAD varies under different
datasets, which have various user scales, attribute domain sizes
and data distributions. Therefore, we will conduct a comprehensive
experiment in Appendix J to further analyze the performance of
AHEAD under different experimental parameters and conclude
important observations for its practical adoption.
5.3 Evaluation for 2-dim Range Query
MSE under Various Privacy Budget. We evaluate the impact
of varying privacy budget on the algorithms under 2-dim queries.
Here, we focus on the synthetic datasets since they can reflect the
algorithms’ performance on the standard distribution and facilitate
the adjustment of the dataset parameters. Each dataset contains 10
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records, sampling from 2-dim Laplacian and Gaussian distributions
respectively, with two domain sizes as 256 × 256 and 1024 × 1024.
Figure 6 shows the results over 2-dim Laplacian and Gaussian
distributions respectively. We adopt correlation coefficient 𝑟 = 0.8
the same with [73] between the two attributes. The MSEs of Uni
and CALM are out of scale, thus their results are omitted here.
Based on the results, we have the following observations. 1)
AHEAD outperforms HDG throughout the privacy budget settings.
HDG leverages coarse 2-dim grids to bucketize the 2-dim domain,
and captures the correlation information between two attributes.
For a 2-dim 1024 × 1024 domain, the finest granularity of HDG
is 8 × 8 in experiments. Using such coarse-grained grid results
in the loss of some fine-grained data correlation. AHEAD estab-
lishes multiple granularity decompositions for sub-domains with
different frequency values. For a sub-domain with high frequency
value, which has a great impact on query answers, AHEAD uses
fine-grained decomposition to estimate the frequency distribution
within the sub-domain. Thus, the data correlation will be captured
more accurately. 2) AHEAD is robust to the changes in domain size.
On one hand, a larger domain size means that users need to be
divided into more groups. For example, AHEAD partitions users
into 8 groups for domain size 256 × 256, and 10 groups for domain
size 1024 × 1024. There are fewer users in each group for a larger
domain size, which will increase the added noise in the frequency
values. On the other hand, the sub-domains whose frequencies are
smaller than the threshold are not further divided from the layer
where they first appear. These sub-domains will be estimated multi-
ple times by user reports from different groups. After the weighted




of the original noise errors, where 𝛽 is the
number of the estimation times. Comparing two adjacent subplots
in Figure 6, the impact of the threshold setting is greater than that
of domain size changes. Thus, the MSE of AHEAD almost does not
vary across different domain sizes, and we select diverse domain
sizes to further verify this fact in Section J.2.
MSE under Various Attribute Correlation. Then, we evaluate
the impact of different attribute correlations on query errors as
shown in Figure 7. For each subplot, we vary the correlation co-
efficient 𝑟 from 0.1 (weakly correlated) to 0.9 (strongly correlated)
with a fixed privacy budget 𝜖 = 1.1. From the results, we have
following findings. 1) The MSE of AHEAD almost does not change
with different correlations. AHEAD decomposes both dimensions
simultaneously, thus better protecting the correlation of the data.
(a) 2-dim Laplacian, |𝐷 | = 2562 , vary 𝜖 (b) 2-dim Laplacian, |𝐷 | = 10242 , vary 𝜖 (c) 2-dim Gaussian, |𝐷 | = 2562 , vary 𝜖 (d) 2-dim Gaussian, |𝐷 | = 10242 , vary 𝜖
Figure 6: Comparison of different methods on 2-dim Laplacian andGaussian datasets under various privacy budgets. We only
plot the methods that are scalable in each setting. HDG is a baseline method. The results are shown in log scale.
(a) 2-dim Laplacian, |𝐷 | = 2562 , vary 𝑟 (b) 2-dim Laplacian, |𝐷 | = 10242 , vary 𝑟 (c) 2-dim Gaussian, |𝐷 | = 2562 , vary 𝑟 (d) 2-dim Gaussian, |𝐷 | = 10242 , vary 𝑟
Figure 7: Comparison of differentmethods on 2-dim Laplacian andGaussian datasets under various attribute correlation. The
results are shown in log scale.
2) The data utility of HDG changes significantly with the correla-
tion of attributes, and becomes worse with a stronger correlation.
HDG combines finer-grained 1-dim grid to estimate the frequency
distribution. If the correlation between two attributes is not very
strong, the fine-grained 1-dim grid can complement the deficiencies
of the coarse-grained 2-dim grid. Otherwise, the supplementary 1-
dim information may be counterproductive. It is interesting to find
that correlation 𝑟 = 0.5 seems to be the intersection of HDG and
AHEAD, which may guide the aggregator to select the better algo-
rithm based on the correlation of attributes. For high-dimensional
scenarios, we also evaluate the impact of different attribute correla-
tions on query errors as shown in Section J.4, where AHEAD reacts
similarly as 2-dim scenes.
5.4 Evaluation for High-dimensional Range
Query
In this subsection, we evaluateAHEAD on high-dimensional private
datasets. As observed in Figure 6 and Figure 7 (where the domain
size is 256×256 and 1024×1024), MSEs ofHDG and AHEAD are not
sensitive to domain size. Therefore, we fix the domain size |𝐷 | = 26





records, which are sampled from high-dimensional Laplacian
and Gaussian distributions, respectively. We refer the readers to
Appendix I for the evaluation AHEAD on high-dimensional real-
world datasets due to space limitation.
MSE under Two Expansion Methods. Recalling the two exten-
sion ways in Section 4.5, i.e., DE and LLE, we compare the MSEs
of the two expansion methods under the 3-dim range query. For
queries higher than 3 dimensions, we only consider LLE since the
DE method is too time-consuming.
From Figure 8, we observe that AHEAD with LLE obtains lower
MSEs than DE. The sub-domains obtained by DE are equilateral
high-dimensional cubes. AHEAD tends to use the underlying nodes,
inducing more nodes used in the answering process. For example,
when answering query [1, 1] × [1, 8] × [1, 8] in a 3-dim dataset with
domain [1, 8] × [1, 8] × [1, 8], AHEAD selects the 64 leaf nodes at
the bottom to answer the query instead of using higher-level nodes
with larger sub-domains, which causes error accumulation in query
answer. Although LLE needs to divide users and gather different
attribute combination records from each user group, i.e., holding
fewer records to estimate the frequency for each layer of AHEAD
trees compared to DE, the maximum entropy optimization step of
LLE incorporates more information, thus resulting in smaller MSEs.
MSE under Various Privacy Budget. Figure 8 shows the results
over 3-dim and 5-dim datasets, respectively. We adopt correlation
coefficient 𝑟 = 0.8 to quantify the correlation between attributes,
following the same setting as [73].
Based on the results, we have the following observations which
are consistent with our analysis in Section 4.5. 1) AHEAD is robust
to the changes in data distributions. Recalling the derivation of
parameters \ and 𝐵 in Section 4.4, AHEAD does not have specific
requirements for the distribution of users’ data. When the entire do-
main is adaptively divided, the same \ ensures that the frequencies
of intervals have similar overall errors. Therefore, from Figure 8(b),
Figure 8(d) (or Figure 8(f), Figure 8(h)), AHEAD behaves similarly
on different datasets. Under the same dataset parameters,HDG uses
the same granularity 1, 2-dim grids to aggregate user records, then
answering queries based on the uniform assumption. Therefore, on
the Laplacian distribution with more uneven frequency, the MSEs
of HDG are larger than those on the Gaussian distribution. 2) For
(a) 3-dim Laplacian, 𝑁 = 106 , vary 𝜖 (b) 3-dim Laplacian, 𝑁 = 107 , vary 𝜖 (c) 3-dim Gaussian, 𝑁 = 106 , vary 𝜖 (d) 3-dim Gaussian, 𝑁 = 107 , vary 𝜖
(e) 5-dim Laplacian, 𝑁 = 106 , vary 𝜖 (f) 5-dim Laplacian,𝑁 = 107 , vary 𝜖 (g) 5-dim Gaussian, 𝑁 = 106 , vary 𝜖 (h) 5-dim Gaussian, 𝑁 = 107 , vary 𝜖
Figure 8: Comparison of different methods on high-dimensional Laplacian and Gaussian datasets under various privacy bud-
gets. DE and LLE respectively represent two high-dimensional expansion methods, i.e., “direct estimation” and “leveraging
low-dimensional estimation”. HDG is a baseline method. The results are shown in log scale.
(a) Laplacian, 𝑁 = 106 , |𝐷 | = 64𝑚 (b) Laplacian, 𝑁 = 107 , |𝐷 | = 64𝑚 (c) Gaussian, 𝑁 = 106 , |𝐷 | = 64𝑚 (d) Gaussian, 𝑁 = 107 , |𝐷 | = 64𝑚
Figure 9: The MSE of different methods when varying data dimension𝑚 with 𝜖 = 1.1. The results are shown in log scale.
high-dimensional queries, the performance of AHEAD is more de-
pendent on the scale of user records. Compared with HDG which
only needs to divide users into different attribute combinations,
AHEAD needs to further part users into different layers in 2-dim
trees (recall Algorithm 5 in Appendix F). For a 3-dim dataset with
attribute domain size |𝐷 | = 64, AHEAD randomly divides the users
into 𝐶2
3





where the number of user records in each group of AHEAD is half
of that of HDG, i.e., doubling noise error of AHEAD. Therefore,
from Figure 8(a) and 8(b), we know that the superiority of AHEAD
will decrease with fewer user records.
MSE under Various Data Dimension. We evaluate the perfor-
mance of AHEAD and HDG with varying dimensions of data (from
3-dim to 10-dim), which are sampled from multivariate Laplacian
and Gaussian distribution with correlation coefficient 𝑟 = 0.8.
From Figure 9, AHEAD is robust to the changes in data dimen-
sion. Recalling Section 4.5, with the data dimension𝑚 increasing,
LLE needs to divide users into more groups due to more attribute
combinations, i.e., holding fewer user records to estimate the fre-
quency for each 2-dim AHEAD tree. For instance, when𝑚 = 3, the
number of attribute combination is 𝐶2
3
= 3, and when𝑚 = 10, the
number of attribute combination is𝐶2
10
= 45. Since LLE constructs a
query set with associated 2
𝑚
queries (recall Algorithm 6 in Appen-
dix F), the maximum entropy optimization step of LLE incorporates
more query information with higher dimension, thus resulting in
almost consistent MSEs with dimension increasing.
6 DISCUSSION
Highlights of AHEAD. 1) Through dynamically building the tree
structure, AHEAD addresses the limitations of the state-of-the-art
LDP methods, which significantly enhances the query accuracy
and can motivate the development of future LDP based privacy-
preserving frameworks. 2) To overcome the hindrance in finding
the optimal partition [45],AHEAD decomposes the domain by lever-
aging the tree fanout 𝐵 and the threshold \ , which are theoretically
derived under rigorous LDP guarantees. From the experimental
results, these parameter settings work well both in low and high
dimensional scenarios. 3) By conducting an in-depth analysis of
AHEAD under various privacy budget, domain size, user scale, dis-
tribution skewness, data dimension and attribute correlation, we
conclude some useful observations for adopting AHEAD (recall the
observations in Appendix J).
Limitations and FutureWork. Below, we discuss the limitations
of AHEAD and promising directions for further improvements. 1)
For high(>2)-dimensional range query, AHEAD is sensitive to the
scale of user records. AHEAD needs to divide users 2 times, i.e., par-
tition into different attribute combinations and different layers in
2-dim trees. Thus, when the number of group user is large, AHEAD
needs sufficient user records to ensure the accuracy of the fre-
quency estimation of each 2-dim layer. 2) Compared to HDG using
only two grids, i.e., finer-grained 1-dim and sparser-grained 2-dim
grids, AHEAD generates 2-dim intervals with various granularities
to decompose the entire domain. Therefore, in practice, AHEAD
requires longer frequency value searching time and larger memory
usage compared to HDG. A layer fusion strategy can be designed
for each 2-dim AHEAD tree to compress tree height. 3) AHEAD is a
completely dynamic framework, which uses the threshold to deter-
mine the division of each sub-domain. In the cases of large domain
size, each sub-domain needs to be compared with the threshold,
which unavoidably increases the computational overhead. Since the
higher-level node represents a relatively large sub-domain (whose
frequency value is generally greater than the threshold), a ‘static’
and ‘dynamic’ hybrid tree structure can be potentially adopted. For
instance, the top few layers can use the static framework, while
the remaining layers can leverage the threshold to decompose the
sub-domains in line with the dynamic framework.
7 RELATEDWORK
Frequency Estimation under LDP. The notion of local differ-
ential privacy (LDP) was introduced in [38]. Duchi et al. [15] sys-
tematically analyzed the LDP algorithm and gave LDP’s theoretical
upper bound based on information theory. For LDP scenarios, one
of the upmost basic tasks is frequency estimation of user values.
Erlingsson et al. [20] proposed RAPPOR, which is the first practical
example of frequency estimation. The algorithm uses the Bloom
filter [7] to encode the private data, and then leverages a random
response (RR) method [68] to perturb the encoded data. After that,
several mechanisms [5, 6, 15, 68] were also proposed for frequency
estimation under LDP. Wang et al. [61] compared the estimation
variance of different algorithms and gave algorithm recommen-
dations under different domain sizes. Wang et al. [60] proposed a
wheel mechanism with a same variance as OUE [61].
Marginal Release under LDP. Marginal release are widely stud-
ied under LDP. Kulkarni et al. [10] proposed to apply the Fourier
transformation method and Ren et al. [56] proposed to apply the
expectation maximization method. The state-of-the-art method
CALM [78], strategically choose sets of attributes and adaptively
choose a randomization algorithm to reduce the noise effect. We
notice that the methods for marginal release can be also used to
answer range queries. Thus, we have also analysed CALM’s perfor-
mance in Section 3.4.
Range Query under DP. The range query problem has been stud-
ied extensively in the centralized setting including works based
on hierarchy [12, 27, 40, 51], coarsened domain [39, 50, 71, 72, 77],
Wavelet or Fourier transformation [3, 70], or publishing a synthetic
dataset [25]. Hay et al. [26] proposed DPBench to evaluate algo-
rithms for answering 1-dim and 2-dim range queries. McKenna et al.
[43] presented HDMM to answer workloads of predicate counting
queries. BothNgram [8] and AHEAD adopt the adaptive tree strate-
gies and leverage the decomposition threshold to balance utility
and privacy. However, they are different in terms of the DP setting
and targeted data type. 1) Ngram is designed and analyzed for DP
scenarios, while AHEAD is orientated to the local setting. 2)Ngram
publishes the sequential data with DP guarantee, while AHEAD
aggregates one/multi-dimensional ordinal attributes satisfying LDP.
Range Query under LDP. For 1-dim scenarios, Cormode et al.
[11] applied the Haar wavelet tranform to the LDP setting and
proposed DHT. Wang et al. [62] leveraged the idea of hierarchical
intervals and presentedHIOmainly for answering 1-dim and 2-dim
range queries. For answering 2-dim and high-dimensional range
queries, Wang et al. [73] designed the state-of-the-art methodHDG,
which is inspired by the Adaptive Grids approach [50] under DP.
There are some works that utilized an relaxation of 𝜖-LDP [69] or
leveraged the properties of workload [19] to achieve significant
gains in utility of query answer.
Besides the above problems, DP (LDP) has been also used for
other data analysis tasks, such as heavy hitters [5, 53, 58, 63], lo-
cation [4, 9], graph data [30, 31, 54, 57], key-value data [24, 75],
evolving data [37], machine learning [1, 34, 67]. Their problem def-
initions are different from ours, thus not suitable for comparison.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a novel LDP protocol for the one and
multi-dimensional range query problem, by leveraging adaptive
hierarchical decomposition. Our method satisfies rigorous LDP
guarantees while achieving advantageous utility performance with
the theoretically-derived parameters. Through theoretical analysis
as well as extensive experimental evaluation, we show the effective-
ness of AHEAD in balancing utility and privacy for range queries
and its significant advantages over the state-of-the-art methods.
Furthermore, by studying various parameter settings, we conclude
several important observations for adopting AHEAD in practice.
Our source code is available on GitHub at https://github.com/link-
zju/ccs21-AHEAD.
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A THE RATIONALITY OF SAMPLING
PRINCIPLE
AHEAD can adopt two strategies to utilize the privacy budget: the
privacy budget splitting strategy and the user partition strategy.
More specifically, the privacy budget splitting strategy divides the
whole privacy budget 𝜖 into 𝑐 pieces and estimates the frequency
distribution with all users’ reports under privacy budget 𝜖/𝑐 . The
user partition strategy randomly assigns the users into 𝑐 groups
and uses the whole privacy budget to obtain the frequencies from
each group of users. For the same node, the variances of the two











and Var2 = 𝑐𝑁
4𝑒𝜖
(𝑒𝜖−1)2 . Since 𝜖 is greater than 0
and 𝑐 is a positive integer greater than 1, we know Var1 > Var2.
Therefore, under the same setting, the user partition strategy has a
less noise error than the privacy budget splitting strategy.
For inconsistency of different levels, previous studies [46, 61, 64]
have proven that the error of user partition is small. In addition,
when answering queries, AHEAD uses the combination with the
least number of nodes, so the inconsistency will not cause conflicts
when answering queries.
B AHEAD SATISFIES 𝜖-LDP
AHEAD can answer range query while satisfying rigorous LDP
guarantees as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem B.1. AHEAD satisfies 𝜖-LDP.
Proof. In Step 1, the users randomly select their group ID in
[1, 2, · · · , 𝑐] without privacy budget consumption. In Step 2 and
Step 3, AHEAD sequentially interacts with users, and each user
produces a single output. In Step 4, AHEAD does not touch users’
private data, thus incurring no additional privacy budget. Therefore,
if the interaction with users (Step 2 and Step 3) meets the 𝜖-LDP,
AHEAD satisfies 𝜖-LDP [36].
In each interactive round,AHEAD constructs the noisy frequency
based on the OUE protocol with privacy budget 𝜖 in Step 2. For any
pair of possible values 𝑣1, 𝑣2 ∈ 𝐷 belonging to the same user in the
group 𝑔, a noisy binary vector 𝑂 is every potential output in the
range of OUE.
Pr [𝑂 |𝑣1, 𝑔]
Pr [𝑂 |𝑣2, 𝑔] =
Πℓ
𝑖=1
Pr [𝑂 [𝑖 ] |𝑣1, 𝑔]
Πℓ
𝑖=1




Pr [𝑂 [𝑖 ] |𝑣1 ] · Pr [𝑔]
Πℓ
𝑖=1
Pr [𝑂 [𝑖 ] |𝑣2 ] · Pr [𝑔]
≤ Pr [𝑂 [𝑣1 ] = 1 |𝑣1 ] Pr [𝑂 [𝑣2 ] = 0 |𝑣1 ]








1/(1 + 𝑒𝜖 ) ·
1 − 1/(1 + 𝑒𝜖 )
1 − 1/2 = 𝑒
𝜖 , (11)
where ℓ is the length of𝑂 . The 𝑝 and 𝑞 are the flipping probabilities
of the OUE protocol. When 𝑝 = 1
2
and 𝑞 = 1(𝑒𝜖+1) , OUE can obtain
the minimal variance [61]. From Equation 11, Step 2 satisfies 𝜖-
LDP. Since Step 3 processes uploaded noisy data, i.e., not using the
users’ original private data, there is no additional privacy budget
consumption. Because of the above, the overall process satisfies
𝜖-LDP. □
C PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Using Equation 3 to combine the frequencies of child nodes, the
node 𝑛 can achieve the minimal updated variance.
Proof. According to [66], when 𝐷 is large and 𝜖 is not too large,
each interval’s estimated frequency value
ˆ𝑓 is approximate to 𝑓 +𝑋 ,
where 𝑓 is the true frequency value and 𝑋 is a random variable
following Gaussian distribution N(0,VarOUE). If 𝑢 is a leaf node,
without loss of generality, we assume that





𝑓 (𝑢) + N (0,Var(𝑢) )






Assuming the used coefficients for weighted average are _1 and
_2, the weighted average between 𝑓 (𝑛) and
∑
𝑢∈𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 (𝑛) 𝑓 (𝑢) is an
unbiased estimation of node 𝑛’s frequency with _1 + _2 = 1.





˜𝑓 (𝑛) is equal to _2
1
Var(𝑛) + _22Var𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 (𝑛) . When
_1 =
Var𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 (𝑛)
Var𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 (𝑛) + Var(𝑛)
, _2 =
Var(𝑛)
Var𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 (𝑛) + Var(𝑛)
,
we can minimize the variance of
˜𝑓 (𝑛). After the weighted average,
the variances still fit Gaussian distribution. Thus the above proof
still holds when 𝑢 is not a leaf node. □
D THE PSEUDO-CODE OF 2-DIM AHEAD
As shown in Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4, the main difference
between 1-dim and 2-dim AHEAD is the decomposition process
(lines 4, 9 of Algorithm 3).
Algorithm 3 2-dim AHEAD Tree Construction
Input: All users’ value set 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑁 }, attribute domain
𝐷 , tree fanout 𝐵, privacy budget 𝜖 , threshold \
Output: AHEAD Tree 𝑇
1: 𝑐 = log𝐵 |𝐷 |
2: // Step 1: User partition
3: Randomly divide users into 𝑐 parts {𝑉1,𝑉2, . . . ,𝑉𝑐 }
4: Create the root node of tree𝑇 with initial interval 𝑒0
0
= [1, |𝐷 |]×
[1, |𝐷 |] and 𝑇 . node(𝑒0
0
).𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 = 1
5: for 𝑖 from 1 to 𝑐 do
6: // Step 2: New decomposition generation
7: for 𝑗 , node in enumerate(𝑇 . node(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑖 − 1)) do
8: if node. frequency > \ then
9: Divide interval 𝑒𝑖−1
𝑗
into 𝐵 disjoint intervals {𝑒𝑖−1
𝑗,𝑘
}











17: // Step 3: Noisy frequency construction
18: 𝐹 = FO(𝑉𝑖 ,𝑇 . node(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑖) . interval, 𝜖)
19: for 𝑘 , node in enumerate 𝑇 . node(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑖) do
20: 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒. frequency = 𝐹 [𝑘]
21: end for
22: end for
23: // Step 4: Post-processing
24: Run Algorithm 4
25: return 𝑇
Algorithm 4 Post-processing
Input: AHEAD tree 𝑇 , tree fanout 𝐵
Output: AHEAD tree 𝑇
1: for 𝑖 from 1 to 𝑐 do
2: norm_sub(𝑇 . node(level = i) . frequency)
3: end for
4: for 𝑗 from 𝑐 − 1 to 1 do
5: for _, node in enumerate 𝑇 . node(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑗) do
6: 𝑓1 = node.frequency, 𝑓2 =
∑
node. children(). frequency
7: node.frequency = _1 𝑓1 + _2 𝑓2
8: end for
9: end for
10: for 𝑘 from 1 to 𝑐 do
11: for _, node in enumerate 𝑇 . node(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = 𝑘) do
12: if node.children() == None then:
13: node . add_children()





Here, we provides a detailed complexity analysis of the algorithms
used in our evaluation. For ease of exposition, we assume that all
attributes have the same domain 𝐷 .
Table 3: Comparison of complexity for different methods.
The table lists the server-side computation, server-side stor-
age, and client-server commutation.
Time Space Comm
1-dim
AHEAD 𝑂 (𝑙𝑜𝑔 |𝐷 |2 · 𝑁 · |𝐷 |) 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |) 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |)
CALM 𝑂 (𝑁 · |𝐷 |) 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |) 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |)
HIO 𝑂 (𝑙𝑜𝑔 |𝐷 |5 · 𝑁 · |𝐷 |) 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |) 𝑂 (𝑙𝑜𝑔( |𝐷 |))
DHT 𝑂 (𝑁 + |𝐷 |3) 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |2) 𝑂 (𝑙𝑜𝑔( |𝐷 |))
2-dim
AHEAD 𝑂 (𝑙𝑜𝑔 |𝐷 |2 · 𝑁 · |𝐷 |2) 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |2) 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |2)
HDG 𝑂 (𝑁 ) 𝑂 (𝑁 12 ) 𝑂 (𝑙𝑜𝑔|𝐷 |)
TimeComplexity. For 1-dim scenarios, the computation ofAHEAD





for the 𝑖-th group of users, i.e.,𝑂 (𝑙𝑜𝑔 |𝐷 |2 ·𝑁 · |𝐷 |) in total. The sim-
ilar arguments also hold for the hierarchy-based HIO method, i.e.,
𝑂 (𝑙𝑜𝑔 |𝐷 |5 · 𝑁 · |𝐷 |). Because the domain size 𝐷 is usually large in
the range query scene, CALM adopts OUE to aggregate the users’
data, which takes 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |) for each user, and 𝑂 (𝑁 · |𝐷 |) in total.
For DHT, the running time is dominated by the sum operation
and inverse transformation. Specifically, the method first sums the
reports of users with the same index, which should count all of
them for each user, i.e., 𝑂 (𝑁 ). After that, DHT also needs an in-
verse transform process to produce the estimated frequency, i.e.,
𝑂 ( |𝐷 |3). For 2-dim scenarios, the domain size changes from |𝐷 |
to |𝐷 | × |𝐷 |. AHEAD selects fanout 𝐵 = 4 and the computation
becomes𝑂 (𝑙𝑜𝑔 |𝐷 |4 ·𝑁 · |𝐷 |2). To estimate the user frequency distri-
bution, HDG should evaluate hash functions for each report from
users, i.e., 𝑂 (𝑁 ) in total.
Space Complexity. We measure the storage needed except that
occupied by the inputs and outputs, which is the same amount
of storage for all methods. For 1-dim scenarios, AHEAD and HIO
needs to maintain the hierarchical tree structure, requiring 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |)
storage. The CALM method sums length-|𝐷 | vector reported by
each user to calculate the frequency distribution, which also needs
𝑂 ( |𝐷 |) storage. Due to the inverse transform process, for DHT, a
storage to count all possible intermediate results are needed, i.e.,
𝑂 ( |𝐷 |2). For 2-dim scenarios, the domain becomes 𝐷 × 𝐷 , thus
AHEAD require 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |2) storage to maintain the hierarchical tree
structure. The storage of HDG depends on the granularity of 2-dim
grids. Base on the analysis in [73], HDG needs 𝑂 (𝑁 12 ) storage.
Communication Complexity. Since HIO, DHT and HDG uses
OLH [61] as FO, the report by OLH is only one bit, plus the index,
which can be represented by 𝑙𝑜𝑔 |𝐷 | bits or 𝑙𝑜𝑔|𝐷 |2 bits for 2-dim
HDG. The CALM method adopts OUE, where each user should
report a length-|𝐷 | binary vector, requiring 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |) bits. AHEAD is
dominated by distributing the domain decomposition to each user.
Considering the worst case, AHEAD needs 𝑂 ( |𝐷 |2).
Algorithm 5 Associated 2-dim AHEAD Tree Construction
Input: All users’ value set 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑁 }, private attribute
dimensions𝑚, private attributes set𝐴, attribute domain 𝐷 , tree
fanout 𝐵, privacy budget 𝜖 , threshold \
Output: AHEAD Forest {𝑇 }
1: 𝑐 = 𝐶2𝑚
2: Randomly divide users into 𝑐 parts {𝑉1,𝑉2, . . . ,𝑉𝑐 }
3: // Step 1: Building Block Construction
4: for 𝑘, {𝑎𝑥 , 𝑎𝑦}𝑥≠𝑦 in enumerate(pairwise attributes) do
5: {𝑇 }. add(2dim_AHEAD_tree(𝑉𝑘 [𝑎𝑥 , 𝑎𝑦], 𝐷, 𝐵, 𝜖, \ ))
6: end for
7: // Step 2: Consistency on Attributes
8: for ℓ from 1 to 𝑇 .height do
9: for attribute 𝑎𝑥 in enumerate(𝐴) do
10: make {𝑇 . node(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 = ℓ) . frequency} consistent on 𝑎𝑥
11: end for
12: end for
13: return {𝑇 }
Algorithm 6 Estimating Answer of𝑚-dim Range Query
Input: AHEAD forest {𝑇 },𝑚-dim range query 𝑅⋂ [𝛼 𝑗 ,𝛽 𝑗 ]𝑚𝑗=1
Output: answer of𝑚-dim range query
1: // generate a set of𝑚-dim range queries










𝛼 𝑗 , 𝛽 𝑗
] ) | 𝑎 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴}
3: // associated 2-dim queries’ answers
4: for _, {𝑎 𝑗 , 𝑎𝑘 } 𝑗≠𝑘 in enumerate(pairwise attributes) do










𝛼 𝑗 , 𝛽 𝑗
] ) | 𝑎 𝑗 ∈ (𝑎𝑥 , 𝑎𝑦)}
6: 𝑓𝑞 (𝑥,𝑦) (𝑄 (𝑞 (𝑥,𝑦) )) = 𝑇 (𝑥,𝑦) . frequency(𝑄 (𝑞 (𝑥,𝑦) ))
7: end for
8: // Step 3: Maximum Entropy Optimization
9: maximize −∑𝑔∈𝑄 (𝑞) 𝑓𝑞 (𝑔) · log (𝑓𝑞 (𝑔))
10: return 𝑓𝑞 (𝑅⋂ [𝛼 𝑗 ,𝛽 𝑗 ]𝑚𝑗=1 )
F EXTENDING AHEAD TO
HIGH-DIMENSIONAL RANGE QUERY
The extending process contains three steps as follows.
• Step 1: Building Block Construction. AHEAD groups all at-
tributes in pairs to form 𝐶2𝑚 2-dim attribute pairs. Then, AHEAD
estimates the frequency distributions for the 2-dim attribute pairs
separately, i.e., a total of 𝐶2𝑚 2-dim trees.
• Step 2: Consistency on Attributes. AHEAD achieves consis-
tency on all𝑚 attributes among the related 2-dim trees. For exam-
ple, the attribute 𝑎 is involved in (𝑚 − 1) attribute pairs. Assume
these (𝑚 − 1) 2-dim trees are {𝑇1,𝑇2,𝑇3, · · · ,𝑇𝑚−1} and each tree
has ℓ layers except for the root node. For an integer 𝑘 ∈ [1, 𝐵ℓ/2],
we define 𝑓𝑇𝑖 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘) to be the sum of frequencies of 𝑇𝑖 nodes in
level ℓ , whose specified sub-domain corresponds to 𝑎 is in [(𝑘 −
1) · |𝐷 |
𝐵ℓ/2 +1, 𝑘 ·
|𝐷 |
𝐵ℓ/2 ]. To make all 𝑓𝑇𝑖 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘) consistent,AHEAD cal-
culates their weighted average as 𝑓 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘) = ∑𝑚−1𝑖=1 _𝑖 · 𝑓𝑇𝑖 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘),
where _𝑖 is the weight of 𝑓𝑇𝑖 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘) and
∑𝑚−1
𝑖=1 _𝑖 = 1. Then, we
















(d) Salaries, |𝐷 | = 1024, vary \
Figure 10: Impact of threshold setting under various privacy budgets. The red star corresponds to our theoretical threshold
obtained from Equation 4. The results are shown in log scale.
𝑓 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘), i.e., Var[𝑓 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘)] = ∑𝑚−1𝑖=1 _2𝑖 · Var[𝑓𝑇𝑖 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘)], where
Var[𝑓𝑇𝑖 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘)] is the total variance of the nodes used for the
calculation of 𝑓𝑇𝑖 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘). Based on the analysis in [73], when
the weights are inversely proportional to the variance of the
estimates, Var[𝑓 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘)] achieves the minimum. Thus, the opti-
mal weight _𝑖 =
1
Var[𝑓𝑇𝑖 (𝑎,ℓ,𝑘) ]
/∑𝑚−1𝑖=1 1Var[𝑓𝑇𝑖 (𝑎,ℓ,𝑘) ] . We should
update each involved node in𝑇𝑖 by adding the amount of change
(𝑓 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘) − 𝑓𝑇𝑖 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘))/𝐵ℓ/2 to make each 𝑓𝑇𝑖 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘) equal to
𝑓 (𝑎, ℓ, 𝑘). Based on the analysis in [52], the consistency pro-
cess makes {𝑇1,𝑇2,𝑇3, · · · ,𝑇𝑚−1} agree on attribute 𝑎 without
changing the frequency distributions of other attributes. Thus,
following any order of these attributes, AHEAD can achieve con-
sistency on all𝑚 attributes. Noting that each 2-dim tree has ℓ
layers, AHEAD needs to conduct the above process for all ℓ layers.
• Step 3: Maximum Entropy Optimization. The problem we
faced is to estimate the frequency of the𝑚-dim query with par-
tial information from 2-dim queries. We adopt the principle of
Maximum Entropy [52]. Specifically, for an𝑚-dim range query











𝛼 𝑗 , 𝛽 𝑗
] ) | 𝑎 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴} ,
where [𝛼𝑡 , 𝛽𝑡 ] represents the query interval and [𝛼𝑡 , 𝛽𝑡 ] is the
complement of it. For 2
𝑚
queries 𝑔 ∈ 𝑄 (𝑞), we define 𝑓𝑞 (𝑔) as the
set of answers for queries in 𝑄 (𝑞). Similarly, for 2-dim scenarios,
we can obtain the query set








𝛼 𝑗 , 𝛽 𝑗
] ) ∧ (𝑎𝑘 , [𝛼𝑘 , 𝛽𝑘 ] or [𝛼𝑘 , 𝛽𝑘 ])} ,
and answer set 𝑓𝑞 ( 𝑗,𝑘 ) . For any query 𝑔
( 𝑗,𝑘) ∈ 𝑄 (𝑞 ( 𝑗,𝑘) ), we use
𝑓𝑞 ( 𝑗,𝑘 ) (𝑔 ( 𝑗,𝑘) ) to denote its answer. In particular, for a 𝑔 ( 𝑗,𝑘) ∈
𝑄 (𝑞 ( 𝑗,𝑘) ), 𝑓𝑞 (𝑔 ( 𝑗,𝑘) ) means 𝑔 ( 𝑗,𝑘) ’s answer constructed from 𝑓𝑞
by summing up the answers of the associated queries in 𝑄 (𝑞).
Then we can formulate the following optimization problem:
maximize −∑𝑔∈𝑄 (𝑞) 𝑓𝑞 (𝑔) · log (𝑓𝑞 (𝑔))
subject to ∀𝑔∈𝑄 (𝑞) 𝑓𝑞 (𝑔) ≥ 0
∀𝑎 𝑗 ,𝑎𝑘 ∈𝐴∀𝑔 ( 𝑗,𝑘 ) ∈𝑄 (𝑞 ( 𝑗,𝑘 ) ) 𝑓𝑞 ( 𝑗,𝑘 ) (𝑔 ( 𝑗,𝑘) ) = 𝑓𝑞 (𝑔 ( 𝑗,𝑘) )
The above optimization problem can be addressed by an off-the-
shelf convex optimization tool. To solve the frequency estimation
problemmore efficiently,AHEAD can adopt theWeighted Update
[73], which achieves almost the same accuracy as the Maximum
Entropy.
G VALIDATION OF THRESHOLD CHOICE
Recalling the analysis in Section 4.4, by setting a threshold, we do
not divide the sub-domains whose frequencies are smaller than
the threshold. A reasonable threshold setting can balance the noise
error and non-uniform error thus minimizing the overall estimation
error.
Here, we omit the post-processing step in AHEAD to highlight
the effect of the threshold values. Figure 10 shows the impact of
different threshold settings in AHEAD. The horizontal axis of each
plot represents the threshold from 0 to 1. The red star on each line
is the threshold value obtained by Equation 4 in Section 4.4.
From Figure 10, we have the following observations consistent
with our analysis. 1) A large thresholdwill cause theMSE to increase
significantly. The reason is that a larger threshold would make the
estimated frequency distribution closer to the uniform distribution.
In this way, the non-uniform error will dominate the estimation
error (recall Equation 8) thus degrading the overall accuracy. On
the Loan dataset, when the threshold value is larger than 0.4096, the
MSE becomesmore than 2×10−3, which is ten times of theminimum
MSE. 2) A small threshold has little impact on MSE, e.g., on the
BlackFriday dataset, the MSE hardly changes when the threshold
is less than 0.0064. In this case, the MSE is mainly caused by the
noise error, which is related to the privacy budget. 3) On different
datasets, the optimal experimental threshold values are also various.
For example, on the BlackFriday dataset, the optimal experimental
threshold is 0.0256 for 𝜖 = 1.5. While on the Salaries dataset, the
optimal experimental threshold is 0.1024. 4) It is worth noting that
the theoretical \ is not exactly the empirically observed optimum
in some cases. In the derivation of \ , we use the true frequency
value 𝑓 . However, in the practical implementation of AHEAD, we
only have access to the estimated frequency value
ˆ𝑓 , i.e., the true
frequency value 𝑓 with a random noise variable 𝑋 . Since OUE is
an unbiased protocol, the expected value of
ˆ𝑓 is equal to 𝑓 , making
the theoretical \ close to the empirically observed optimum.
We also provide the distribution of the number of leaves in
Figure 11 and Figure 12. The upper part of each sub-graph is the
true frequency distribution, and the following is the corresponding
node number distribution of AHEAD with 𝜖 = 1.1. From Figure 11
and Figure 12, the node number distributions are almost the same
with the true frequency distributions, which confirms the rationality
of the threshold selection in Section 4.4. More specifically, when
the frequency of the sub-domain is large, AHEAD further divides
(a) Loan, |𝐷 | = 256, \ = 0.006 (b) Financial, |𝐷 | = 512, \ = 0.004 (c) BlackFriday, |𝐷 | = 1024, \ = 0.013 (d) Salaries, |𝐷 | = 2048, \ = 0.026
Figure 11: The distribution of the number of leaves inAHEAD in 1-dim scenes. The top of each picture shows the true frequency
distribution, and the bottom shows the corresponding distribution of the number of leaves with 𝜖 = 1.1.
(a) Laplacian, |𝐷 | = 2562 , \ = 0.003 (b) Laplacian, |𝐷 | = 10242 , \ = 0.004 (c) Gaussian, |𝐷 | = 2562 , \ = 0.003 (d) Gaussian, |𝐷 | = 10242 , \ = 0.004
Figure 12: The distribution of the number of leaves inAHEAD in 2-dim scenes. The top of each picture shows the true frequency
distribution, and the bottom shows the corresponding distribution of the number of leaves with 𝜖 = 1.1.
the sub-domain, i.e., more nodes for estimation, to reduce the non-
uniform error. Otherwise, AHEAD does not decompose the sub-
domain, i.e., less nodes for estimation, to suppress the noise error. In
addition, from Figure 5(d) and Figure 11(d), when the frequencies are
more uniformly distributed across nodes inmost subtrees (the nodes
fell into the interval [1024, 2048]), AHEADwill behave better owing
to smaller non-uniform errors (refer to more details in Section 4.3).
H DATASET DESCRIPTION
Table 4: Correlation between attributes of Salaries.
𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎3 𝑎4 𝑎5
𝑎1 1 -0.6638 -0.3631 0.2344 0.2344
𝑎2 -0.6638 1 0.0208 0.2442 0.2442
𝑎3 -0.3631 0.0208 1 0.4665 0.4665
𝑎4 0.2344 0.2442 0.4665 1 1
𝑎5 0.2344 0.2442 0.4665 1 1
Here, we provide a detailed description of the datasets used in
our evaluation.
Table 5: Correlation between attributes of BlackFriday.
𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎3 𝑎4 𝑎5
𝑎1 1 -0.0508 -0.0030 -0.0062 0.0083
𝑎2 -0.0508 1 -0.0552 -0.4010 -0.3749
𝑎3 -0.0030 -0.0552 1 0.0774 0.0566
𝑎4 -0.0062 -0.4010 0.0774 1 0.3239
𝑎5 0.0083 -0.3749 0.0566 0.3239 1
Table 6: Correlation between attributes of Loan.
𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎3 𝑎4 𝑎5
𝑎1 1 0.0018 0.9431 0.2398 0.1519
𝑎2 0.0018 1 0.0460 0.0436 0.0481
𝑎3 0.9431 0.0460 1 0.2633 0.1651
𝑎4 0.2398 0.0436 0.2633 1 0.9612
𝑎5 0.1519 0.0481 0.1651 0.9612 1
• Salaries1: This dataset is about San Francisco city employee
salary data on an annual basis from 2011 to 2014. It contains
1
https://www.kaggle.com/kaggle/sf-salaries
148,654 records and 13 attributes, where we select 5 attributes
as shown in Table 4.
• BlackFriday2: This dataset is a sample of the transaction
records in a retail store, who wants to know the customer
purchase behavior against different products. It contains
537,577 records and 12 attributes, wherewe select 5 attributes
as shown in Table 5
• Loan3: This dataset provides the complete loan data of Lend-
ing Club for all loans issued through 2007-2018. It contains
2,260,668 records and 150 attributes, where we select 5 at-
tributes as shown in Table 6
• Financial4: This synthetic dataset is generated by the PaySim
mobile money simulator [42]. It contains 6,362,620 records
and 11 attributes, including transaction type, customer ID
and transaction amount. Since the distribution of transac-
tion amount is quite skewed, we truncate the data greater
than 500,000. After the truncation, the processed dataset has
6,022,336 records, i.e., 94.6% of the original data remaining.
Then, we divide the range of transaction amount [0, 500000]
into slots of a fixed length and bucketize the records with a
domain size of 512.
I HIGH-DIMENSIONAL RANGE QUERY ON
REAL DATASETS
In this section, we evaluateAHEAD on high-dimensional real-world
datasets, where the correlations between the selected attributes are
shown in Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6. With domain size |𝐷 | = 64
for each dimension, we show the MSE of AHEAD for 2-dim, 3-dim
and 5-dim range query, respectively. Under each setting, we set 8
different privacy budgets.
Base on the results in Figure 13, we have the following obser-
vations which are consistent with our analysis in Section 4.5 and
Section 5.4. 1) AHEAD outperformsHDG throughout most cases. 2)
AHEAD with LLE obtains lower MSEs than DE. 3) The data utility
of HDG changes significantly with the correlation of attributes,
and becomes worse with a stronger correlation. For instance, as
shown in Figure 13(g), Figure 13(h) and Figure 13(i), the superiority
of AHEAD will increase with the stronger correlation between at-
tributes, i.e., ‘installment’ in 3-dim and ‘last_pymnt_amnt’ in 5-dim
(recall Table 6).
J PRACTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF AHEAD
In this section, we systematically analyze the impact of privacy
budget, user scale, domain size, data skewness, data dimension
and attribute correlation on the performance of AHEAD and the
state-of-the-art methods.When focusing on one variable, we should
ensure the others are consistent. Therefore, the experiments are
mainly conducted on the four synthetic datasets. The observations
in our following analysis can help adopt AHEAD in practice as well
as assess existing LDP-based range query frameworks.
J.1 Impact of User Scale
Setup. We compare the algorithms’ performance at increasing
user scales, i.e., from 103 to 107. Under each user scale 𝑁 , we set 8
different privacy budgets. As shown in Figure 14, we use heatmaps
to illustrate the impact of user scale and privacy budget on the MSE.
In practical use, the privacy budget is usually specified by users
for satisfying their privacy requirements. Then, the aggregator
needs to ensure query accuracy under the fixed privacy budget.
For instance, when privacy budget 𝜖 = 1, the aggregator desires
MSE not higher than 10
−2
to ensure the accuracy of the query
results. Figure 14(a) and Figure 14(d) show the MSE of AHEAD over
different coupling of user scale and privacy budget. To meet the
accuracy demand, the aggregator needs to collect at least 5 · 103
user records with AHEAD. In comparison, previous works require
more user records (more than 10
4
) for satisfying the same level
of accuracy. For stronger privacy protection, i.e., smaller privacy
budget, all methods require more user records. Based on the above
observations, we summarize the following observation for selecting
a proper user scale.
Observation 1 (Necessity of choosing proper user scale).
When the privacy protection strength is fixed, i.e., a determined pri-
vacy budget 𝜖 , one needs to use an appropriate user scale to ensure
algorithm performance.
Next, we take a step further to analyze the relation between
user scale and privacy budget in order to provide easy methods
for selecting user scale. As shown in Figure 14(a) and Figure 14(d),
AHEAD has similar MSEs under different combinations of user scale
and privacy budget. When user scale 𝑁1 = 10
6
and privacy budget
𝜖1 = 0.1, the MSE of AHEAD is 10−3.0809 on the Zipf dataset. In
addition,AHEAD obtains similarMSE (10−3.0563) with𝑁1 = 104 and
𝜖2 = 1. Based on the results in Figure 14(b), Figure 14(e), Figure 14(c)
and Figure 14(f), HIO and DHT also have the user scale & privacy
budget exchangeability. All the three evaluated methods leverage
the FO protocol when collecting user private data. From Equation
2, the variance of OUE is 4𝑒
𝜖
𝑁 (𝑒𝜖−1)2 . The Var can be converted to
4
𝑁 (𝑒𝜖+𝑒−𝜖−2) , which is approximate to
4
𝑁𝜖2
when 𝜖 is not large (𝜖 ≤
2). Then, the variance of the estimated frequency is approximately
the same if the product𝑁𝜖2 of two combinations is equal. Therefore,
we have the following observation.
Observation 2 (The exchangeability between user scale
and privacy budget). For any two pairs of user scale and privacy






is satisfied, AHEAD can achieve a similar MSE under
two pairs (𝑁1, 𝜖1) and (𝑁2, 𝜖2).
J.2 Impact of Domain Size
Setup. There are 8 different domain sizes used in the experiments.
In addition, we set 7 different privacy budgets to explore the cou-
pling effect of domain size |𝐷 | and privacy budget 𝜖 on MSE.
1) From Figure 15(b), Figure 15(c), Figure 15(e) and Figure 15(f),







(a) 2-dim, Salaries, vary 𝜖 (b) 3-dim, Salaries, vary 𝜖 (c) 5-dim, Salaries, vary 𝜖
(d) 2-dim, BlackFriday, vary 𝜖 (e) 3-dim, BlackFriday, vary 𝜖 (f) 5-dim, BlackFriday, vary 𝜖
(g) 2-dim, Loan, vary 𝜖 (h) 3-dim, Loan, vary 𝜖 (i) 5-dim, Loan, vary 𝜖
Figure 13: Comparison of different methods on high-dimensional real datasets under various privacy budgets. DE and LLE
respectively represent two high-dimensional expansion methods, i.e., “direct estimation” and “leveraging low-dimensional
estimation”. HDG is a baseline method. The results are shown in log scale.
(a) AHEAD, 1-dim Zipf , |𝐷 | = 256 (b) HIO, 1-dim Zipf , |𝐷 | = 256 (c) DHT, 1-dim Zipf , |𝐷 | = 256
(d) AHEAD, 1-dim Cauchy, |𝐷 | = 1024 (e) HIO, 1-dim Cauchy, |𝐷 | = 1024 (f) DHT, 1-dim Cauchy, |𝐷 | = 1024
Figure 14: The MSE of different methods when varying user scales and privacy budgets. The results are shown in log scale.
(a) AHEAD, 1-dim Zipf , 𝑁 = 105 (b) HIO, 1-dim Zipf , 𝑁 = 105 (c) DHT, 1-dim Zipf , 𝑁 = 105
(d) AHEAD, 1-dim Cauchy, 𝑁 = 105 (e) HIO, 1-dim Cauchy, 𝑁 = 105 (f) DHT, 1-dim Cauchy, 𝑁 = 105
Figure 15: The MSE of different methods when varying domain sizes and privacy budgets. The results are shown in log scale.
increase of domain size. Since all the three algorithms adopt the
user partition strategy and the number of groups grows with the
domain size, the user scale in each group becomes smaller for
a larger domain size. For example, when domain size rises from
32 to 4096, the number of user groups enlarges from 5 to 12 for
DHT. Based on Equation 1 and Equation 2, the variance of the FO
algorithm is inversely proportional to user scale. 2) As shown in
Figure 15(a) and Figure 15(d), AHEAD is less affected by the changes
in domain size. Due to the threshold setting, AHEAD makes the
actual domain size smaller by amalgamating some lower frequency
sub-domains. In addition,AHEAD averages the estimated frequency
values of repeated sub-domains, e.g., sub-domains [0, 3] and [6, 7]
in Figure 3, to reduce the influence of noise. Based on the results in
Figure 15 and the above analysis, we have the following observation
on the impact of domain size.
Observation 3 (Robustness under various domain sizes).
The impact of varying domain size on AHEAD is different from HIO
and DHT. AHEAD reacts more robust to domain size changes.
J.3 Impact of Data Skewness
Setup. We compare the algorithms’ performance at various data
skewnesses, where the data records are sampled from low skew-
ness (0 for both Gaussian and Laplacian) to high skewness (0.9 for
Gaussian and 2.0 for Laplacian). As shown in Figure 16, under each
user scale, we set 8 different privacy budgets and use heatmaps to
illustrate the impact of skewness and privacy budget on the MSE.
1) From Figure 16(a) and Figure 16(d), when privacy budget
𝜖 ≤ 0.1, the MSEs of AHEAD have a tendency to decrease with
the increase of data skewness. Since there may exist more nodes
suitable for pruning for data with higher skewness, i.e., more sparse
sub-domains, AHEAD can significantly suppress the injected noises.
2) With the increase of privacy budget or user scale, the impact
of skewness becomes insignificant on MSE of AHEAD. Recalling
Equation 4 in Section 4.4, the threshold \ becomes small with a
large privacy budget or user scale. For instance, \ = 0.11 when
𝜖 = 0.1 and 𝑁 = 106, and \ = 0.003 when 𝜖 = 1 and 𝑁 = 107. For
large privacy budgets or user scales, AHEAD reduces the intensity
of tree pruning, where the impact of data skewness on the tree
construction will weaken.
Observation 4 (The benefit from high skewness). AHEAD
tends to have smaller MSE on highly skew data, where the impact of
skewness will weaken as the privacy budget or user scale increases.
J.4 Impact of Attribute Correlation
Setup. Next, we evaluate the impact of different attribute corre-
lations on query errors as shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18. The
experimental settings are similar to 2-dim scenes, i.e., varying the
correlation coefficient 𝑟 from 0.1 (representing weakly correlated)
to 0.9 (representing strongly correlated) with a fixed privacy budget
𝜖 = 1.1.
From the results, we have the following findings. 1) The LLE
method can protect the correlation between attributes in high-
dimensional situations. Instead of decomposing all dimensions si-
multaneously like DE, LLE uses the 2-dim AHEAD tree to estimate
the answers of high-dimensional range queries. TheMSE ofAHEAD
behaves consistently across different correlations, thus the correla-
tion of the data is well preserved by LLE. 2) For high-dimensional
scenarios, the impact of attribute correlation becomes less on HDG.
With the increase of dataset dimension, the number of 1-dim grids
(𝐶2𝑚) increases faster than the 1-dim grids (𝐶
1
𝑚). Therefore, as shown
in Figure 18, the negative impact of the 1-dim grids on the correla-
tion is reduced.
Observation 5 (Robustness under various attribute cor-
relation). The MSE of AHEAD behaves consistently on attribute
correlation changes. As the data dimension increases, the impact of
correlation on HDG decreases.
J.5 Remarks
The six observations mentioned above reflect the impact of various
factors on the performance of AHEAD. Observation 1 and Obser-
vation 2 describe the coupling influence of user scale and privacy
budget on algorithm accuracy and demonstrate the transformation
relationship between the user scale and privacy budget. Observa-
tion Observation 4 provides an encouraging of practical adoption
of AHEAD when facing highly skew data. Observation 3 and Ob-
servation 5 demonstrate the advantageous robustness of AHEAD
under different domain sizes and attribute correlations.
(a) AHEAD, 1-dim Gaussian, 𝑁 = 105 (b) AHEAD, 1-dim Gaussian, 𝑁 = 106 (c) AHEAD, 1-dim Gaussian, 𝑁 = 107
(d) AHEAD, 1-dim Laplacian, 𝑁 = 105 (e) AHEAD, 1-dim Laplacian, 𝑁 = 106 (f) AHEAD, 1-dim Laplacian, 𝑁 = 107
Figure 16: The MSE of AHEAD when varying data skewnesses and privacy budgets. The results are shown in log scale.
(a) 3-dim Laplacian, 𝑁 = 106 , vary 𝑟 (b) 3-dim Laplacian, 𝑁 = 107 , vary 𝑟 (c) 3-dim Gaussian, 𝑁 = 106 , vary 𝑟 (d) 3-dim Gaussian, 𝑁 = 107 , vary 𝑟
Figure 17: Comparison of different methods on 3-dim Laplacian and Gaussian datasets under various attribute correlations.
DE and LLE respectively represent two high-dimensional expansion methods, i.e., “direct estimation” and “leveraging low-
dimensional estimation”. HDG is a baseline method. The results are shown in log scale.
(a) 5-dim Laplacian, 𝑁 = 106 , vary 𝑟 (b) 5-dim Laplacian, 𝑁 = 107 , vary 𝑟 (c) 5-dim Gaussian, 𝑁 = 106 , vary 𝑟 (d) 5-dim Gaussian, 𝑁 = 107 , vary 𝑟
Figure 18: Comparison of different methods on 5-dim Laplacian and Gaussian datasets under various attribute correlations.
In detail, 1) when the privacy protection strength (the privacy
budget 𝜖) is fixed, according to Observation 1, AHEAD obtains more
accurate query answers with larger user scales. 2) If the user scale
is insufficient, the aggregator tends to pay the cost, such as com-
pensation fee, to trade with users to reduce the strength of privacy
protection (increasing the privacy budget 𝜖). From Observation 2,
the aggregator can readily calculate the appropriate 𝜖 based on
the user scale. 3) For the continuous attribute, the aggregator di-
vides the total domain into slots of a fixed length and bucketize
the records at a suitable granularity for queries [11, 62]. Therefore,
when the domain size is 1024, the bucketize granularity is two times
that of the domain size 512. From Observation 3, since AHEAD is
more robust to domain size changes, the aggregator can choose a
larger domain size to obtain a higher granularity. 4) When private
data tends to have a high skewness, such as data from income,
social networks and Web surfing, practitioners should give priority
to AHEAD from Observation 4. 5) From Observation 5, in practice,
AHEAD can handle the impact of attribute correlation varying.
